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Employers are increasingly using wellness programs to improve health and lifestyle of employees.
Many employers offer wellness programs to reduce health care costs. This dissertation examines
enrollment in health insurance and medical utilization when a wellness program is offered by the
employer. Using a unique dataset of health insurance choice and utilization, the study estimates
the effect of peer choices and family health on the choice of a health insurance plan with a wellness
program. The results show that a 10 percentage point rise in the peer enrollment in the wellness
plan increases the likelihood of own enrollment by 1.4 to 3.7 percentage points. The presence of
severe health conditions reduces the probability of enrollment by up to 4 percentage points, but
more intense users of medical services have a higher probability of being enrolled in the wellness
plan. Looking at the utilization of medical services, I use propensity matching mechanism to
compare the sample of wellness member to non-members. The results suggest that following
enrollment, wellness members tend increase the use of preventive care services. Use of emergency
and inpatient hospital services declines in both expenditure and number of visits. However, overall,
the growth in preventive care use offsets the decline in emergency and inpatient care use. These
results suggest that, at least in the short to medium term, preventive care is not likely to moderate
the growing medical expenditure. However, improved information about the benefits of wellness
plans may result in wider gains in the longer term.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The increasing prevalence of lifestyle conditions such inactivity, poor nutrition, and tobacco and
alcohol use in the United States have spurred major policy changes on both federal and local levels
(McGinnis and Foege, 1993). The impetus for policy stems from the evidence linking the lifestyle
conditions to chronic diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, and chronic pulmonary conditions.
These conditions, previously limited to individuals near or at retirement, are affecting working
age Americans adding an economic burden through reduced productivity and increased lifetime
medical care. A report released by the Milken Institute estimated that the cumulative health care
costs associated with chronic disease totaled around $277 billion (Mattke et al. 2013).
The rising health care costs of chronic medical conditions are reflected directly in the health
insurance cost born by employees as well as employers. As a result, employers, in cooperation
with insurers have tried various insurance programs to direct the medical care utilization by the
insured. The health maintenance organizations (HMO), in the 1990s, were intended to place the
primary care physician in charge of directing and coordinating the medical care received by the
patient. The primary care physician (PCP) was the first point of contact for the patient in medical
care, and acted to both coordinate and regulate the flow of medical services. Over time, however,
HMO’s become less popular as patients disliked the constraint on choice. Glied (2000) provides a
1
comprehensive overview of HMO’s.
Wellness programs have become a new way for employers to motivate healthier lifestyle and bet-
ter medical utilization. A wellness program is a set of financial incentives, resources, and health
screenings offered alongside or independently of health insurance, which may include gym mem-
bership discounts, counseling for nutrition, smoking cessation, and diabetes management, as well
as a health risk assessment. Wellness plans have gained notoriety in media as some employers
have made enrollment mandatory in such plans. A New York Times article in September 2013
described a stand-off between the faculty and administration in a large university, as the faculty
protested the mandatory wellness plan. The objection focused on the mandatory nature wellness
questionnaire which, though containing health information, is not protected by the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The protest instigated a Congressional
review of workplace wellness questionnaires (Singer, 2013).
A RAND Survey of Employers in 2013, approximately 50% of US employers offer a wellness
program to employees. These programs can be offered independently or as part of the health
insurance benefits, either as a mandatory or an optional component of health insurance. Wellness
programs can include screening activities, such as a health risk assessment, as well as interventions,
such as discounts and incentives for healthy lifestyle. According to the survey, 72% of employers
who offer a program combine both screening and intervention features (Mattke et al. 2013).
The wellness program studied here was introduced by a large self-insured employer in 2008 as
part of the health insurance benefits available to all eligible employees. The wellness program was
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integrated into a health insurance plan, Aetna Wellness. It was offered in parallel to an Aetna plan
with an identical structure but without the wellness benefits. Aetna Wellness offered gym member-
ship discounts, counseling for smoking-cessation, nutrition, diabetes, and stress management. It
required members to select a primary care physician (PCP), and to complete an online health risk
assessment questionnaire.
The aim of Chapter 1 is to describe Aetna Wellness and place it in the broader context of employer
wellness programs. Section 2 will discuss the economic underpinnings of prevention. Section 3
will address the laws and subsidies governing wellness programs on the federal and state level.
Section 4 will describe all the health insurance plans offered by the employer. The details of Aetna
Wellness program will be introduced in Section 5. That section will also discuss how the plan was
introduced to employees. Section 6 will discuss the benefit structure administered by the employer.
Section 7 will preview the subsequent chapters.
1.2 Economics of Wellness
The Grossman (1972) health capital model provides the theoretical underpinnings for demand for
wellness and preventive care. As the health capital deteriorates, the individual has incentive to
invest through preventive activities. Though preventive care comes at a cost of consumption as
well as time, at the optimum, the individual equates the marginal return to the investment with
the marginal cost of preventive care. Thus, the model informs us that as the cost of engaging in
preventive care declines, the optimal level of preventive care increases.
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Demand for preventive care, therefore, is indirect as it increases the health capital stock, resulting
in greater individual utility and ability to engage in market and non-market production. The return
to preventive care, however, has substantial time dynamics associated with it. Not only is the return
to preventive care uncertain, but it can also be substantially deferred in time. Preventive care could
be most effective when the health capital stock is high, but it’s returns are also most deferred. The
lower the health capital stock, the lower the return to preventive care, but any gains have almost
immediate effect.
From a health policy perspective, the uncertainty and deferred nature of the returns calls into
question the cost effectiveness of prevention. Kenkel (2000), however, argues that the appropriate
metric for evaluating preventive care is in terms of life years saved. From societal viewpoint, in
addition to the explicit medical care costs, the individual utility gains from the extended life years
must be accounted in the cost-effectiveness analysis. Kenkel (2000) cites Russell (1986) conclu-
sion that while there are exceptions, "prevention usually adds to medical expenditures, contrary to
the popular view that it reduces them."
This dissertation studies a wellness program, including preventive care, as part of a health insur-
ance plan by a large self-insured employer. While from a social point of view, the cost of preventive
care are offset by the life years extended, for the employer the benefits of preventive care must be
in the form of reduced costs or improved productivity. Since the life years gained are at the end of
an employee’s life, the employer does not benefit from them. However, improved employee health
would translate into reduced absenteeism and presenteeism – both of which reflect the productivity
of the employee.
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Ehrlich and Becker (1972) examine the implications of moral hazard of employer provided health
insurance. In particular, the authors emphasize ex ante moral hazard which arises as the indi-
vidual has reduced incentive to engage in self-protective behaviour. As the employee enrolls in
health insurance, he/she is less likely to stop smoking or reduce weight as the cost of curative care
decreases on the margin. This externality imposed by the employee on the employer takes the
form of decreased productivity and increased event based medical care – emergency room use and
hospitalizations.
Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005) building on the evidence of higher medical expenditure for
obese individuals by Finkelstein et al. (2003), explore whether the higher cost is born primarily
by the employer or employee. Comparing employee wages among employer who do and do not
provide insurance, the authors find that obese workers earn on average $1.42 less per hour than non-
obese workers among insured employees. The difference in these cash wages can be explained by
the difference in the expected medical care costs between these two groups. Their results suggest
that while employers cannot price insurance on the basis of employee characteristics, they do not
bear the additional cost of medical care for obese employees.
While obesity is easily observed by the employer, Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005) concede that
for less observable health characteristics, such as smoking and diabetes, the employer is unable to
transfer the higher medical costs to the employee through lower wages. In this setting, therefore,
the higher medical cost would be shared by the employer and employees.
To summarize, the health capital model predicts that the individual undertakes preventive care
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to the point where the marginal benefit of the care equates to the cost. As the cost of prevention
declines, the optimal level of preventive care increases. The choice in the level of health capital,
however, affects employee’s productivity at work and, thus, acts as a negative externality on the
employer. The introduction of employer provided health insurance further increases the wedge
of the externality by further reducing employee incentive to invest in health stock. Thus, the
employer has an incentive to correct the externality by encouraging or mandating preventive care
– to increase employee productivity and to reduce utilization of medical care.
Without addressing the issue of moral hazard, this dissertation examines the choice and utilization
of a wellness program. Chapter 2 examines how employees choose among health plans with the
wellness option. Since the wellness program reduces the time cost of engaging in preventive
activities, all else equal, demand for the plan should be high. Despite an additional $1,500 in
incentives, enrollment in the health plan with wellness features has grown very slowly. The chapter
explores two factors in this puzzle of plan choice: peer enrollment in Aetna Wellness, and family
health.
The chapter extends the model developed in Abaluck and Gruber (2011) for choice of a health in-
surance plan. In the model, preferences is represented by a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
where utility is a function of the cost if insurance. The costs are characterized by premium and
out-of-pocket medical expenditure, as well as non-financial time costs described by the hassle asso-
ciated with learning about and fulfilling requirements of the plan. Therefore as the cost of learning
about the wellness plan declines, probability of enrollment should increase. Peer enrollment in the
health plan with wellness acts to reduce the cost of learning, as the employee finds out about the
effort required through the experiences of their peers. The hassle costs are also a function of the
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health status of employee and family, which may affect their ability to fulfill the requirements of
the wellness plan. The health status may also make wellness less salient to the employee.
Chapter 3 evaluates the changes in utilization occurring as a result of enrollment in the wellness
program. As the wellness program reduces the cost of preventive care, the number of visits should
increase. Since the aim of the program is to reduce event based hospitalizations and emergency
room use, this chapter examines the evidence in the form of composition of medical expenditure
and visits. The results confirm Russell (1986), while emergency and inpatient care decrease, they
are more than offset by the rising cost of preventive care.
Reflecting the discussion by Kenkel (2000), however, the benefits of the greater preventive care
may not materialize in the short or medium term. Since the panel used in the present analysis
covers a 6 year period, its conclusions are limited to the short-term effect of preventive policy.
Thus, the analysis will be limited to the utilization of medical care in terms of cost and visits. The
long term health effects of preventive care cannot be gleamed from the present data, and will be
left to future analysis.
The conclusions of this dissertation provide further evidence to update Kenkel (2000). Preventive
care and lifestyle changes impose non-financial costs on employees. As Chapter 2 show, informa-
tion is a major obstacle in the participation in the wellness plan. Coupled with the $1,500 financial
incentive for family enrollment, experience based learning about the wellness plan results in much
higher enrollment. However enrollment in a wellness plan does not necessarily translate into par-
ticipation. As Chapter 3 suggests, in the short and medium window, uptake in preventive care
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is significant, but it is not matched by sufficient changes in use of emergent and inpatient hospital
care. Since this dataset does not provide metrics of health behaviours, a longer time window would
be required to see the effects of increased preventive care on health outcomes.
1.3 Federal Policy
Because wellness programs include financial incentives, these programs are regulated on the fed-
eral level. Before the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the most significant federal
requirement was the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) which regu-
lated health care access, portability and renewability of health insurance, as well as set in place
nondiscrimination provisions. Under HIPAA, an individual cannot be denied eligibility for ben-
efits or charged more for group health coverage based on any health factor. However, wellness
programs are exempt from this provision as long as the reward is based on an individual satisfying
a standard related to a health factor and participation is made available to all similarly situated
individuals (Mattke et al. 2013).
The ACA states that wellness programs may provide financial incentives for satisfying standards
related to a health factor if the following requirements are met:
• The total reward of all the plan’s wellness programs that require a satisfaction of a standard
related to a health factor must not exceed 20% of the cost of employee-only coverage under
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the plan. If dependents may participate in the wellness program, the reward must not exceed
20% of the cost of the coverage in which an employee and any dependent are enrolled.
• The program must be reasonably designed to promote health and prevent disease.
• The program must give individuals eligible to participate the opportunity to qualify for the
reward at least once per year.
• The reward must be available to all similarly situated individuals. The program must allow
a reasonable alternative standard for obtaining the reward to any individual for whom it is
unreasonably difficult because of a medical condition, or medically inadvisable, to satisfy
the initial standard.
• The plan must disclose all the materials describing the terms of the program and the avail-
ability of a reasonable alternative standard (Mattke et al. 2013).
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) raised the allowable incentive share to 30% of the cost of cover-
age in 2014, and provided federal discretion in raising the incentive share to up to 50%. Further-
more, ACA allows employers to charge tobacco users up to 50% more in premiums than nonusers,
if they provide a smoking-cessation wellness program that would allow employees to eliminate the
extra charge on the premium through participation.
Starting in 2018, the ACA will enact an excise tax, the "Cadillac" tax, of 40% on health insurance
plans which cost more than $10,200 for an individual and $27,500 for a family, in 2018 dollars.
These costs include both the employee and employer contribution toward the premium, and contri-
butions to flexible spending accounts, health savings accounts, and health reimbursement accounts.
A self-insured employer would be responsible for the tax associated with all costs exceeding the set
limits. A 2011 Mercer survey of 2,844 public and private US employers found that 61% of those
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companies surveyed said they would trigger the excise tax unless they took steps to reconfigure
their benefit offerings (Health Affairs Brief, 2013).
To avoid the effect of this excise tax, employers are building into their health insurance plans
features to reduce medical utilization, and to improve the lifestyle choices of employees. While
higher deductible and coinsurance rates are a direct way of affecting utilization, many employers
are turning to wellness programs to make employees aware of the health risks, and shift the care
for chronic conditions from high-cost hospital stays to the lower-cost office visits. Since Aetna
Wellness was introduced in 2008, prior to the passage of the ACA, the imposition of the tax did
not motivate the choice or structure of the wellness program.
Finally, the risk assessment questionnaires included as part of wellness programs are usually
administered by third parties. While Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
protects most health information, it exempts workplace wellness programs if they are part of the
employment information. In particular, "The Privacy Rule does not prevent your supervisor, human
resources worker or others from asking you for a doctor’s note or other information about your
health if your employer needs the information to administer sick leave, workers’ compensation,
wellness programs, or health insurance" (www.hhs.gov, 2014).
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1.4 Health Plans
In 2008, when Aetna Wellness became available to employees at the university I study, there were
5 health insurance plans on offer. In addition to Aetna Wellness, employees could choose from the
standard Aetna plan, Aetna 80/20 Plan, a newly introduced Aetna Health Savings Account plan,
and a Third Plan. All the plans on offer have similar coinsurance rates, and differ primarily on the
premium, deductible and network of physicians and hospitals. All the health plans used the same
pharmacy coverage. Table 1 presents a summary of the features of the plans for a family in the
year 2012.
The Aetna plan has a preferred provider organization structure. A member of the plan can choose
any physician from the national Aetna network of physicians and hospital without the need to
choose a primary care physician or any referrals. For physicians outside of the network, the in-
surance would apply the out of network coinsurance rate on the usual and customary amount for
the locality and speciality of the doctor. All charges above and beyond the usual and customary
were the responsibility of the patient. In 2008, the coinsurance rate was 90% for in-network, and
80% for out-of-network care. The copay for all in-network office visits was $12. The plan had a
deductible of $150 for individual and $300 for family coverage, in network, and $400 and $800
out of network respectively.
The Aetna 80/20 plan did not rely on a network of physicians. Instead, it covered 80% of all usual
and customary expenses for medical care irrespective of network status For physicians who were
members of the Aetna network, the plan paid 80% of the negotiated charges. For out-of-network
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care, the patient was responsible for the remainder of the coinsurance, as well as any costs in excess
of the usual and customary. Thus, compared to Aetna, Aetna 80/20 did not increase the freedom
of choice nor decrease the patient financial liability for medical care. The deductible for the plan
in 2008 was $550 for an individual and $1100 for a family.
While the Aetna 80/20 plan was available to all employees, it was used by the employer as a tran-
sition health insurance for retiring employees. Upon retirement, all employees were transitioned
to Aetna 80/20, and could no longer choose another plan. If the employees was less than 65 years
of age, that is, they chose early retirement, Aetna 80/20 was their primary health insurance policy.
Once the retired employee reached the age of 65, Medicare would become their primary health in-
surance, and Aetna 80/20 remained their secondary insurance. As a result, employees intending to
retire transition to the Aetna 80/20 in enrollment period prior to retirement. Employees not retired
at the age of 65 retained full choice of health insurance plan, but have Medicare as the secondary
provider of health insurance.
The Aetna Health Savings Plan was introduced in 2008, in parallel to Aetna Wellness. The Aetna
HSA was a high deductible plan using the Aetna network of physicians and hospitals. The plan had
a deductible of $1100 for an individual and $2200 for a family upon introduction. The employee
could choose to contribute on a before-tax basis to the health savings account, and pay for medical
expenses from these savings without annual time constraints. The health savings account could be
invested using Aetna’s banking partner, J.P. Morgan Chase, for balances of $2000 or higher. The
employer contributed $500 to the health savings account in the year of introduction to build up the
savings. As a result, the Aetna HSA was an attractive option for individuals and families with low
medical utilization, who would furthermore benefit from tax-deferred investment vehicle.
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The last plan available to employees, labeled as Third Plan here, provides comparable benefits to
Aetna. It is a preferred provider organization, with a network of physicians and hospitals different
from the Aetna. To compare the networks, I conducted a search of in-network physicians in the ge-
ographically concentrated area where the employer and employees reside. The resulting lists had
similar number of physicians, suggesting that the networks overlapped substantially. In network,
the Third Plan has the same coinsurance (90%) and copay rates, but out-of-network, the coinsur-
ance rate is lower in this plan at 70%. Prior to the introduction of Aetna Wellness, the Third Plan
had the lowest deductible and premium among all the plans. In 2012, the deductible for in-network
medical care was $150 for an individual and $300 for a family. Throughout the panel years of this
data, the Third Plan has the highest share of enrollment. In 2013, the employer discontinued the
Third Plan. The employees enrolled in the plan were required to select a plan among the remaining
plans. Though a default was not advertised widely, any employee that failed to select a plan would
automatically be enrolled in the Aetna plan.
1.5 Aetna Wellness
Aetna Wellness was introduced to employees in 2008. During the enrollment period in November
2007, the benefit brochure features a letter from the Vice President of Human Resources, which in-
troduced and described the new health plans available. The wording of the letter laid out explicitly
the changes and requirements of Aetna Wellness.
The letter started by emphasizing that Aetna Wellness was introduced in addition to all existing
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plans. Aetna Wellness was designed to "help [sic.] staff and faculty address concerns about well-
ness [sic.]: Aetna Wellness helps support you in your effort to pursue a more healthful lifestyle"
(Overview of Endowed Benefit Plans, 2007).
The brochure continues with an in-depth description of Aetna Wellness. Each page contains an
inset with a summary of most important facts and features of the program. The description of the
plan contains bullet point list of features and requirements:
• All family members who choose to enroll must pick a primary care physician (PCP) from a
list on the enrollment site or the plan web site. The list of participating PCP’s was limited in
both number and geographically.
• The member and the enrolled family members would be given a web site to access in order
to complete a health risk assessment questionnaire.
• The PCP will conduct an annual physical exam and set wellness goals for the year. The
PCP will also refer the member to wellness programming to help achieve the wellness goals.
With the referral, the member will receive discounted rates at participating resources.
• If the member has medical complication or needs special attention, the PCP will refer the
member to local resources for expert help in wellness counseling.
• At the beginning of the following year the member and the PCP will review effort and re-set
the goals for that year
The brochure goes on to emphasize that in other ways the plan works just like the other plans on
offer. There is a network of physicians and specialists that is provided by the nationwide Aetna
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network. The visits to the PCP which are not wellness-related are covered in the same way as with
other plans, and no formal referral is needed to see a specialist.
The brochure concludes that if the employee is willing to commit to a wellness improvement plan,
if he or she is willing to chose a primary care physician from a list of participating physicians, and
if he or she is able to encourage the family members to engage in wellness improvement as well,
then they would benefit from Aetna Wellness. In a table at the end of the introduction, the features
of the plan and the associated copays are listed. The initial routine physical exam, review of the
health risk assessment, and the development of the wellness plan are covered at full. A $12 co-
pay is associated with PCP referrals for further appointments, counseling, or therapy for wellness
improvement. The available referrals are in health behaviour assessment, health risk assessment in-
terpretation, nutrition therapy, medically supervised exercise, team conference, preventive medical
counseling, diabetes education, smoking cessation, and stress management.
No penalty is mentioned for failure to complete the health risk assessment, or having a physical
exam with the PCP. The financial benefits of Aetna Wellness - the lower premium, deductible,
and out-of-pocket maximum - remain in effect independently of member’s effort in the wellness
plan. The brochure makes a side-by-side comparison of the health plans, allowing the employee
to clearly see the lower plan premium, no deductible for in-network care, and lower out-of-pocket
maximum at all levels of coverage. In other aspects, Aetna Wellness has identical setting as Aetna.
In 2013 the employer removed the PCP requirement from Aetna Wellness. The employee could
still enroll in Aetna Wellness and take advantage of the close to $1400 savings in premium and
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deductible, but they were not required to select a primary care physician. However, if a PCP was
not selected, the employee could not take advantage of the special discounts for gym membership
and preventive services. The difference between Aetna Wellness and Aetna Enhanced Wellness is
subtle. For example, Enhanced Wellness allows for more child well exams per year, removes the
limit on number of visits for nutrition counseling, smoking cessation counseling, and alcohol/drug
abuse counseling. This change coincides with the discontinuation of the Third Plan, and a resulting
sharp increase in the enrollment of Aetna Wellness.
To the employer, the Aetna Wellness plan was associated with greater expense. The gym mem-
bership discount as well as the additional counseling incur additional costs to the health insurance
plan. The risk assessment questionnaire is administered by a contracted party. Finally, the physical
examination with the primary care physician is billed at a higher rate since the visit is contracted
to be longer than the standard Aetna allocated office visit. Even before any selection and moral
hazard associated with the particular features of the plan, Aetna Wellness is more expensive for the
self-insured employer to operate.
1.6 Benefit Structure
All employees eligible for benefits are required to select a health insurance plan during the open
enrollment period in November of each year. During the month, the employer provided brochures
as well as information sessions for employees to make a selection from available plans. The
employees were aware of the default option: if the employee did not make an official selection
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of a health plan, they would remain enrolled in the current plan. With the exception of the 2013
discontinuation of the Third Plan, during the panel, an employee may have chosen to default in the
same plan throughout the panel period.
New employees are required to choose a health insurance plan within the first 30 days of em-
ployment. For new employees, no default option exists. If the employee does not select a health
insurance plan within that period, the employee will not be able to enroll in a plan until the follow-
ing November enrollment period.
Figure 1 plots the out-of-pocket expenses for each plan as a function of total medical expenditure
for a family in-network expenses in 2012. The total medical expenditure is on the horizontal axis,
while the vertical axis plots the share of the total medical expenditure, including the premium and
deductible, and the employee would have to pay. Three of the health insurance plans are plotted,
with the Aetna Wellness represented by the blue line. As can be seen from the plot, at every level
of medical expenditure, Aetna Wellness has the lowest out-of-pocket share of medical expenditure
compared to the other plans. Since this includes both premium and deductible, Aetna Wellness is
clearly the least expensive health plan among all the plans.
Figure 2 plots the difference in cost to employee between Aetna and Aetna Wellness for a family
in 2012. The horizontal axis represents the years since introduction of Aetna Wellness. The vertical
axis represents the difference in dollars between Aetna and Aetna Wellness. The lowest solid line
is the difference between the Aetna deductible and Aetna Wellness deductible. The difference in
deductible is positive and increases between 2009 and 2011. The dotted line is the difference in the
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premium, which increases steadily. The top dashed line is the sum of the difference in the premium
and deductible. Over time, as the difference between the deductible and premium, both, grow the
overall cost difference in enrollment between Aetna and Aetna Wellness increases. At its peak, in
2012, the difference in cost between Aetna and Aetna Wellness is $1550 for a family.
Despite the price difference, enrollment in Aetna Wellness was slow to grow. Table 2 lists the
enrollment numbers for each plan across the years. In the year of introduction, 402 employees
enrolled in Aetna Wellness. The enrollment grew slowly until 2011, when it increased by around
330 employees. The next largest increase occurred in 2013 when the Third Plan was discontinued.
Looking at the enrollment in Aetna, its enrollment remains steady in the first two years after the
introduction of Aetna Wellness, and declines only modestly prior to 2013. As the Third plan is
discontinued, the enrollment in Aetna increases sharply as well.
The table also includes the enrollment for Aetna 80/20 and the Aetna HSA plan. Though the
Aetna HSA plan included some incentives for enrollment, its premium was well above other plans,
rendering this plan particularly unappealing to employees. As a result, it is not surprising that
enrollment in the plan remained very low and did not grow over the years. Finally, the Aetna 80/20
enrollment remained constant throughout this period. In 2013, the enrollment in the plan was
halted for non-retired employees, reflected in the decline in enrollment. Because of the idiosyn-
cratic structure and low enrollment, both of these plans are generally excluded from subsequent
analysis.
Figure 3 depicts the share of enrollment between Aetna Wellness, Aetna, and the Third Plan.
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While enrollment in Aetna Wellness increases during the time period, enrollment in Aetna does
not change much. Enrollment in the Third Plan declines substantially, suggesting that much of
the switch into Aetna Wellness was from the Third Plan. This pattern is confirmed in Figure 4. It
plots only the individuals who switched into Aetna Wellness from Aetna or Third Plan. Each bar
represents the number of switchers as a share of their original plan. Thus, in 2008, around 6% of
Aetna members and 4% of Third Plan member switched into Aetna Wellness. This number fell
sharply in 2009 for both groups, though in subsequent years, the share of switchers grew slowly.
Though the share of switchers from Third Plan seems to be smaller or comparable to Aetna, since
the total number of enrollees was larger in the Third Plan it represents a larger number of switchers.
1.7 Preview of Results
In the chapters that follow, Aetna Wellness is analyzed from the point of view of plan selection
and utilization. The aim of the chapters is to study the factors in the selection of Aetna Wellness
by employees, and to characterize the subsequent utilization of the plan.
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I study the choice of health insurance following the introduction
of Aetna Wellness. More than half of US employers offer a wellness plan as part of benefits to
employees in hopes of reducing the total cost of health insurance. While it was priced much lower
than its non-wellness counterparts, the majority of employees actively chose away from Aetna
Wellness. If employees consider the wellness features as a cost, and do not use them, the intended
cost savings will not materialize. The paper looks at two factors in this decision: the effect of peer
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choices and family health status on plan choice. I compare two identical plans – Aetna Wellness
and Aetna, and focus on a subsample consisting of new employees.
I find that peer choices affect own choice of health insurance: a 10 percentage point rise in peer
enrollment in Aetna Wellness increases the probability of own enrollment in the plan by 1.4 to 3.7
percentage points. I use the Charlson index, and an index of medical resource utilization intensity
generated by the ACG software developed at Johns Hopkins University to measure family health
status. A 1 point rise in the Charlson index leads to up to 4 percentage point decline in proba-
bility of enrollment in Aetna Wellness. The index captures employees with more severe health
conditions. A 1 point rise in the resource utilization band, which captures more routine medical
utilization, results in up to 8 percentage point rise in probability of enrollment. The results sug-
gest that an effective information campaign of the benefits of a wellness program could potentially
increase the employee participation and improve long term outcomes of the plan. The program,
however, does not appeal to employees and families with severe medical conditions which might
benefit most from regular outpatient care.
Chapter 3 shifts attention to the medical services utilization in Aetna Wellness. As the increasing
prevalence of chronic health conditions is pushing health insurance costs up, Aetna Wellness is
intended to encourage a change in lifestyle and use of medical care. I study medical expenditure
and utilization following the introduction of Aetna Wellness. The analysis uses propensity score
matching to compare employees who switch into Aetna Wellness to those who do not.
The results show that while overall medical expenditure may be increasing, the composition of
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the expenditure and utilization changes. Aetna Wellness members use the emergency room less (9
percentage points less likely of a mean of 29%). On the other hand, the number of preventive visits
increases (by more than 30%) as does the total outpatient expenditure (up to $776). The results
suggest that while the wellness program by this employer does not affect the overall expenditure,
employees are engaging in more preventive care.
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Table 1.1: Plan Comparison for a Family, All Plans 2012
Aetna Wellness Aetna Third HSA Aetna 80/20
Premium 3515 4555 3828 3615 6133
Deductible
In Network 0 500 300 2400 1100
Out of Network 800 900 900 4800 1100
Out of Pocket Maximum
In Network 4000 4100 4100 5000 7100
Out of Network 7000 7100 7100 7000 7100
Coinsurance
In Network 90 90 90 90 80
Out of Network 80 80 70 80 80
Network Aetna Aetna PHCS Aetna Aetna
Must choose PCP Yes No No No No
Enhanced Wellness Program Yes No No No No
Figure 1.1: Out of Pocket Medical Expenditure for Family in 2012
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Figure 1.2: Aetna v. Aetna Wellness: Cost difference for a family in 2012.
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Table 1.2: Enrollment across years by numbers
Aetna Well Aetna Aetna 80/20 Third HSA
2007 . 763 205 2529 .
2008 402 982 287 3370 12
2009 619 920 265 3215 15
2010 857 819 241 2756 14
2011 1196 807 218 2451 18
2012 1462 778 216 2202 15
2013 2621 1017 152 . 26
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Figure 1.3: Enrollment in Plans, 2007-2012
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Figure 1.4: Switching into Aetna Wellness
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CHAPTER 2
THE HASSLE OF WELLNESS: DO PEERS AND HEALTH STATUS MATTER?
2.1 Introduction
The recent RAND Employer Survey showed that approximately half of surveyed employers offer a
wellness program to its employees. These programs are driven mainly by expectations of slowing
growth of medical and insurance costs for the employer, as well as responding to a substantial tax
incentive provided by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2009. A wellness program can include
a set of screening tools, such as a health risk assessment questionnaire (HRA), as well as inter-
ventions, such as nutritional and smoking-cessation counseling, a disease management program
(diabetes, heart disease, chronic lung disorders, depression, cancer). The program structure can
offer rewards, such as gym discounts, incentives for screening and participation in the programs,
or be punitive, such as higher insurance rates for smokers. These wellness programs appear to be
a benefit, but evidence suggests that there is substantial employee resistance to it.
Is the resistance to wellness programs driven by lack of experience with the program and its
benefits? Or is it driven by genuine disutility from the features of the program? The RAND
report cites that 72% of employers offering wellness plans offer screening and intervention based
programs, and 31% administer it through their health insurance plan. However, only 46% of
employees undergo the screening, and less than a fifth choose to participate in the interventions. In
this paper, I study the effect of the introduction of an optional wellness plan on the health insurance
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plan choice by employees of a large self-insured university. The analysis will focus particularly
on two factors affecting choice: peer choices and own/family health on choice of health plan with
wellness features. The data used for this estimation is uniquely suited for this study. First, the
data tracks the introduction of a health insurance plan with wellness plan in parallel to and on
the basis of an existing plan. This allows me to compare two near identical plans to isolate the
effect of the wellness features on plan choice. Second, the data allows me to limit my analysis to a
subsample of new employees, eliminating the bias introduced by switching costs and simultaneity
of peer choices. Finally, the availability of claims data for employees allows me to define objective
measures of employee and family health.
While on their own the wellness plans appear simply to be an under appreciated employment
benefit, as part of the Affordable Care Act they are a policy tool to transform the way individuals
utilize medical resources. As the managed care experience of the 1990’s and 2000’s suggested,
patients want to remain in control of their health care. As the New York Times article of May
27, 2013 notes, to slow the growth of medical expenditures, employers are increasingly turning to
wellness programs to make the employee an informed patient. The wellness program is intended
to make the individual aware of their health risks, to improve the maintenance of existing health
conditions, and to engage them in preventive care. Since the employee is the primary gatekeeper
of the flow of health services, if the employee resist the wellness program, then it is unlikely to
generate the expected behavioural changes. As the wellness programs become more prevalent,
the success of the programs depend on overcoming this resistance. If the resistance is due to
the genuine disutility from the features of the program, it can be overcome with greater financial
incentives being directed at the employee. If, however, the resistance is due to perception and lack
of information, it can be overcome with improved employee education about the true benefits and
burdens of the program.
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In 2008, a large self-insured university introduced a new plan, Aetna Wellness, as part of its health
insurance benefits menu. Aetna Wellness, was derived from, and offered simultaneously with an
identical Aetna plan. To encourage enrollment, the employer priced Aetna Wellness below all
other plans on offer: lower premium, lower deductible, and lower annual out-of-pocket maximum.
The plan had the same coinsurance rate, copay, and physician, hospital, and pharmacy networks
as Aetna. Unlike Aetna, however, Aetna Wellness required its members to complete a health risk
assessment questionnaire, and select a primary care physician (PCP). The PCP would review the
questionnaire, schedule a physical examination, and develop a set of health goals for the employee
to follow during the year. The employee and family did not need referral from the PCP for specialist
care, and the PCP did not act as a gatekeeper of care in any way. Since Aetna Wellness was offered
in parallel with Aetna, it was an optional choice.
Despite the large financial incentive and the increased choice set, the majority of employees did
not choose Aetna Wellness in its first year of introduction. In the years that followed, many em-
ployees continued to actively choose away from the wellness plan. Most astonishingly, however,
Aetna members switched in very low numbers. That is, those who had the closest comparison and
the lowest cost of switching were less likely to switch to the new plan.
The aim of this paper is to explore two factors in this choice puzzle. I will estimate the effect of
peer choices on own choice of health plan. Peers can affect the choice of health plan by helping
the employee to overcome the informational barriers to choice. If health insurance is a reputation
good, then learning about the experiences with and perceptions of the Aetna Wellness plan by
peers can motivate the employee to choose for or against it. As defined by Satterthwaite (1979),
a reputation good is any product or service for which seller’s products are differentiated and con-
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sumers’ search among sellers consist of a series of inquiries to relatives, friends, and associates
for recommendations. Instead of relying on plan menu brochure, employees rely on colleagues for
evaluation of plan features and quality.
Second, I look at the role of health in the choice of health insurance. Employees and families with
a greater number of health conditions may have direct disutility from a wellness plan. The disutility
may stem from a lack of salience for the word "Wellness". Though the plan brochure emphasized
the advisability of the plan for employees with health conditions, these employees may perceive the
plan as intended for maintaining good health. Furthermore, less healthy employees and families
may be averse to additional doctors’ visits and testing.
Health insurance choice has become an important policy topic in recent years, as seen by the
introduction of Medicare Part D and the expansion of coverage through the Affordable Care Act.
The research in this field, however, has been constrained by a lack of data. As more data have
become available in recent years, economists and epidemiologists alike have been able to estimate
key components of choice of insurance.
The outcomes and utilization of wellness programs have been studied outside of economics. Os-
illa et al. (2012) conduct a systemic review of the worksite wellness program and find little to
moderate gains in medical expenditure. Most of the studies they site, however, do not correct
for selection into the program, or have a short follow-up period. Economic studies of wellness
programs find temporary gains of modest magnitude, such as weight loss incentives offered by
an employer or gym membership incentives (Cawley and Price, 2011; Royer, Stehr, and Sydnor,
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2012).
While the utilization is the main motivator for employer adoption of wellness program, employee
choices are not always optimal. Choices which appear suboptimal have been studied in con-
sumer goods (Shum 2004, Dube et al. 2008), and financial decisions (Madrian and Shea 2001,
Barseghyan et al. 2011). However, most pertinent to the present project is choice inconsistencies
in health insurance (Handel 2011, Abaluck and Gruber 2011, Heiss et al. 2012, Kling et al. 2012,
Ketcham et al. 2012). In this context, Handel (2011) and Abaluck and Gruber (2011) have shown
that switching costs and inability to compare the plan features accounts for a substantial part of
choices.
Handel (2011) considers plan choices in a setting similar to the one used here. An employer
introduces a new health insurance structure forcing all employees to make new choices. Identifying
from the variance in choice between those forced to choose a new plan, and those who can rely
on the default plan, Handel estimates switching costs of up to $2,000 for a family. The plans in
the comparison differ in their coinsurance rates, making the counterfactual analysis difficult. To
avoid this, Handel estimates a full structural model of plan choice, with risk aversion coefficients.
The data used in this project circumvents the issue of switching costs and the counterfactual. It
compares two near identical plans, which have identical coinsurance rates, removing the problem
of the counterfactual. To avoid switching costs, this paper uses two subsamples: new employees
and employees whose previous plan was discontinued.
Abaluck and Gruber (2011) study the choice of Medicare Part D plan choices by the elderly. As
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the elderly parse through sometimes up to 40 different plans, Abaluck and Gruber note that they
are unable to often compare the features of the plans. As a result, the authors estimate that ap-
proximately 30% of the choices in the sample were suboptimal, the result of excessive importance
placed on the premium, and insufficient importance placed on the variance reducing features of
the plans. I will be using the model described by Abaluck and Gruber as the starting point for the
choice model.
Health insurance choice is subject to informational asymmetries, which have been studied since
Akerloff (1970) and Rotchschild and Stiglitz (1976) first formulated the market failure. In recent
years, however, health insurance data has become increasingly available, allowing more accurate
measurement of the magnitude of these effects. Among these, Einav, Finkelstein, Cullen (2010)
and Einav et al. (2013) have used employee data from the aluminum manufacturer Alcoa to esti-
mate the magnitudes and particularities in the effect of moral hazard and adverse selection. Einav,
Finkelstein, Cullen (2010) find that the magnitude of adverse selection in their data is modest. In
Einav et al. (2013), they go a step further to find evidence of selection in moral hazard in plan
choice. In the present research, since Aetna and Aetna Wellness do not differ on the margin, moral
hazard should be the same.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on managed care. The introduction of primary care
physician requirements and health risk questionnaires may have generated employee pushback
associated with managed care. The experience and literature on managed care is summarized by
Glied (2000) in a chapter of Handbook of Health Economics.
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The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I compare near identical plans to isolate the
effect of wellness features on plan choice as it operates through peer effects and family health.
This identification allows me to overcome the endogenous characteristic of choice, and attribute
the difference in choice to preferences over wellness features of the plan.
Second, I am able to limit my analysis to a subsample consisting of new employees and employees
whose health insurance plan was discontinued. As Handel (2011), switching costs are a significant
barrier to optimal plan choice. By using this subsample, I eliminate the impact of switching costs
on plan choice.
Finally, in addition to the health plan choice, the dataset includes every claim filed by the em-
ployee and family. The claims allow me to create an objective measure of health on the basis of
diagnostic and pharmacy codes. To assess health status and predict future health resource utiliza-
tion, I use ACG software developed by The School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University.
The Affordable Care Act, combined with the changes to Medicaid have made health insurance
choices by working age adults an essential component of policy outcomes. However, much of the
literature uses Medicare data to analyze plan choice and utilization. The data used in this paper
was obtained from a large employer, which, though not nationally representative, allows insight
into the decisions by a part of the population affected by the ACA.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 will introduce the health plans
and compare their features. In Section 3 will introduce the data. Here, I will discuss the results
31
derived with the ACG software and definition of peer effects. Section 4 will introduce the model
and discuss identification. Results will be presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 will
conclude.
Health Plans
In 2008, in cooperation with the local area physicians, the employer introduced Aetna Wellness to
the health insurance menu on offer to its employees. Aetna Wellness was derived from and offered
simultaneously with the Aetna PPO plan. The aim of the Aetna Wellness plan was to include
the primary physician more actively in the preventive health care for the member, to identify and
treat health risks before they evolve into costly hospitalizations. The plan was also designed to
encourage healthier lifestyle by offering discounts to the gym, counseling for obesity, smoking
cessation, and stress management. To achieve these goals, the enrollees were required to choose a
primary care physician (PCP) and complete a health risk assessment questionnaire. On the basis
of the questionnaire, the PCP would conduct an annual physical examination. Beyond the initial
examination, the PCP did not act as a gatekeeper for the health plan as the member could use any
specialist services without referrals.
The employer designed the financial characteristics of Aetna Wellness to be comparable with
and more appealing than existing plans. Table 1 presents a side-by-side comparison of all health
insurance choices for a family in 2012. Compared to the Aetna plan, Aetna Wellness had the
same coinsurance rate, the same network of physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies, and no refer-
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rals were necessary for specialist visits. Aetna Wellness was better than Aetna because it had a
lower premium, deductible, and annual out of pocket maximum across the years, and it offered
health services such as discounted gym membership. However, upon enrollment in Aetna Well-
ness, the employee was required to select a primary care physician (PCP), and complete a health
risk assessment questionnaire. These features constitute the additional non-monetary cost of Aetna
Wellness.
The Aetna plan offers the closest comparison to Aetna Wellness, and the analysis will focus on
the trade-off between these two plans. The Third Plan, however, was offered in parallel to both
and had features similar to both plans. Compared to the Third Plan, Aetna Wellness had the same
in-network coinsurance rate. Aetna Wellness had a lower premium, deductible, and annual out
of pocket maximum (with the exception of 2008-2009 period). The Third Plan had a different
network of physicians and a different out-of-network coinsurance. The Third Plan is of interest in
our comparison because in 2013 it was discontinued, forcing its members to make a new choice.
As such, this group of employees is a desirable subsample to study since the absence switching
costs for them removes status quo bias.
Before proceeding, I would like to discuss the remaining two plans on offer to employees: the
Health Savings Account (HSA) and the Aetna 80/20 account. The HSA was a high deductible plan,
though it was initially introduced at a premium comparable to Aetna Wellness, by 2012 it’s pre-
mium was higher. Furthermore, the HSA account acted as a tax deferred investment mechanism,
and thus was very different from the other health insurance plans on offer. As such, enrollment in
the plan has been very low. The Aetna 80/20 plan was designed for retired and retiring employees,
and it was intended primarily as supplemental insurance to Medicare. Enrollment in Aetna 80/20
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was halted in 2013, and it is no longer in the menu of plans. When compared to Aetna Wellness,
in every year both the in- and out-of-network coinsurance rates in Aetna 80/20 have been the same
or worse.
Table 2 presents the enrollment in each plan across the years. As the HSA plan had very low
enrollment, I drop it from all subsequent analysis. The Aetna 80/20 plan has substantial enrollment
the vast majority of the enrollment is by retirees and pre-retirees. Nonetheless, I will include the
Aetna 80/20 plan in some of the multinomial analysis of plan choice. From the other columns of
Table 2, the Third Plan outstrips all other plans in enrollment, while Aetna Wellness and Aetna
have comparable enrollments. A closer inspection reveals that the rise in enrollment in Aetna
Wellness is matched closely by a decline in the Third Plan. Over this time period, enrollment in
Aetna changes by comparatively little.
To explore this further, I compare the share of enrollment between Aetna Wellness, Aetna, and
the Third Plan. Figure 1 describes the share of each of the three plans across time. The Third
Plan is by far the most popular plan until its closure in 2013. However, as seen in Table 2, the
growth in employee share of Aetna Wellness is due to a decline in Third Plan. The Aetna share of
employment remains mostly unchanged throughout the years.
Aetna Wellness was priced to be attractive to employees, and the foregone savings from choos-
ing Aetna are substantial. Figure 2 shows the difference in cost to the employee between Aetna
Wellness and Aetna over time. The bottom line represents the cost difference between the Aetna
and Aetna Wellness in deductible. The middle line represents the difference in premium. The
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top line is the sum of premium and deductible. Since Aetna Wellness has a lower premium and
deductible compared to Aetna in all years, the difference is always positive and growing over the
years. Therefore, the incentive to switch from Aetna to Aetna Wellness increased over the years.
By 2012, an employee choosing Aetna would see close to $1500 in foregone savings as a result of
their plan choice.
Upon its introduction in 2008, and in subsequent years, the benefits brochures provided by the
employer highlighted the benefits of Aetna Wellness. The extensive introduction to the plan high-
lighted that it is a "great plan for faculty and staff members who want to pursue a wellness track
to get and stay healthy". The brochure emphasized that regardless of current health, Aetna Well-
ness would help improve health. The requirements of the plan were listed on the first page: "All
family members who choose to enroll in this plan, including children, must pick a primary care
physician (PCP). You (and your enrolled family members) will be given a Web site to access in
order to fill out a health risk assessment." The benefits of the program are listed in the same sec-
tion, with referred services ranging from nutrition therapy to medically supervised exercise. In
later pages, the Aetna Wellness plan structure is listed in an easy-to-read breakdown of services,
allowing comparison to other plans on the menu.
Despite the favourable introduction and pricing of Aetna Wellness, enrollment increased unex-
pectedly slowly. Not only were employees choosing to remain with their previous plan, but Aetna
members were choosing to actively again switching. Figure 3 tracks the switchers into Aetna
Wellness by their plan of origin across time. Each bar represents switchers from Aetna or Third
Plan as share of their original plan. Thus, in the initial year, a little over 6% of Aetna members
switched into Aetna Wellness. The share declined sharply in 2009 and later years. While it appears
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that switchers from the Third Plan have a comparable switching behaviour to Aetna members, it
helps to keep in mind that the Third Plan had many more members, and thus each bar represents
a much larger number of employees. Combined with the previous figures and tables, this figure
highlights that Aetna members, who have the lowest cost of switching and the closest comparison
to the Aetna Wellness plan are most reluctant to switch.
Thus, while Aetna Wellness was priced and designed to be salient and accessible to all, employee
choices suggest that preferences over the characteristics of the plan are not homogeneous. To some,
the costs of the plans are more prominent than its benefits. In the following section, I look at the
characteristics of members in the plans. Are those who enroll in Aetna Wellness different from the
member of the other plans?
Data
A large self-insured northeastern university granted me exclusive access to the health insurance
plan choices and subsequent utilization of its employees between 2007 and 2013. The sample
includes both salaried and hourly employees in academic, administrative, and union job types.
All the employees in the sample are active, which excludes retired, on-leave, and suspended em-
ployees. Since the department of the employee is an important component of the estimation, all
employees with missing department are excluded from the sample. While dependents are included
in the raw data, all analysis is conducted on the family level, as the employee makes the decisions
about plan types. The resulting sample consists of 13,450 employees tracked across an average 4.2
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years. Of these employees, 9,632 enroll in a health plan at some point during the panel years.
Each November, during the open enrollment period, the employee selected among the five health
insurance plans described in the previous section. These employees can choose to remain in their
original plan or switch to another health plan. If the employee does not take action, their original
health plan is continued into the following year. Because of this default option, any estimates using
the total sample will suffer from status quo bias associated with to switching costs.
To circumvent the problem of switching costs, I use two subsamples of employees. The first
group are new employees. During this period, 4,716 new employees were hired by the university.
To identify the effect of Aetna Wellness on plan choice, the preferred subsample is 1,771 new em-
ployees who select one of the available health insurance plans. I designate as a new any employee
who started employment in mid-year after the open enrollment period for the current period, and
before the following year’s enrollment period. In the first month of employment, the employee
was required to select a health insurance plan. If they did not select a plan, they received no health
coverage until the next open enrollment period. The combination of no previous plan and no de-
fault option makes the new employees the ideal subsample for studying the choice of plans. While
many of the results will be based on this sample, the sample size is an impediment to estimate
precision. To supplement these results, I use a second subsample of employees.
In 2013 the Third Plan was discontinued and employees enrolled in the plan were required to
select from the remaining three choices: Aetna Wellness, Aetna, and the HSA. While the letter of
introduction and plan documentation stresses the requirement to choose a new plan, the Frequently
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Asked Questions notes that if the employee does not take action, they will be moved to the Aetna
plan. Thus, like new employees, this subsample does not suffer from status quo bias; however,
unlike new employees, they have a default option. Employer records show, however, that very
few of the Third Plan member from 2012 defaulted into Aetna in 2013. Nonetheless, though very
small, the results may be affected by this small share of the defaults.
To estimate the effect of health and peers on plan choice, I need to define measures of each. To
define the health status of the employee and family, I make use of the available claims data, and
generate three measures of health. The first, the Charlson Comorbidity Index, is an index which
predicts the 10 year mortality of a patient who may have a range of comorbid conditions from a
total of 22. Each condition is assigned a score 1, 2, 3 or 6 depending on the risk of dying associated
with each one. For example, a score of 1 is assigned to myocardial infarct, congestive heart failure,
peripheral vascular disease, dementia, cerebrovascular disease, chronic lung disease, connective
tissue disease, ulcer, chronic liver disease. A score of 2 is assigned to hemiplegia, moderate or
severe kidney disease, diabetes, diabetes with complication, tumor, leukemia, lymphoma. The
maximum score is 16, and a higher score is associated with greater morbidity. The score is assigned
on the basis of medical claims. The family health index is the sum of the Charlson index for the
employee and dependents. In this sample 79% of families have a Charlson score of 0. Since
the index is heavily skewed, it measures the plan selection on the more severe range of health
conditions spectrum. To capture the middle of the health distribution, I use software developed
at the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health. This software is becoming increasingly
used in economic analysis of health insurance utilization, such as by Handel (2011).
The Johns Hopkins ACG R© software uses diagnostic codes from claims and case-mix methodol-
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ogy to describe and predict population past or future health care utilization and costs. The Ad-
justed Clinical Groups (ACG) are a series of mutually exclusive health status categories defined
by morbidity, age, and sex. They are based on the premise that the level of resources necessary
for delivering appropriate healthcare to a population is correlated with the illness burden of that
population. Thus, individual diseases or conditions are placed into diagnostic groups based on five
clinical dimensions: duration of condition, severity of condition, diagnostic certainty, etiology of
the condition (infectious, injury, other), and specialty care involvement. The software allows me to
generate two measures of individual health: medical utilization intensity, predicted total cost band.
The medical utilization intensity categorizes the individual according to current health services
utilization:
• 0 - No diagnoses available
• 1 - Healthy Users
• 2 - Low Users
• 3 - Moderate Users
• 4 - High Users
• 5 - Very High Users
For the family, the individual medical utilization indices are summed. In the result, only 25% of
the employees have a family score of 0, and the scores are well distributed in the healthy to low
user range.
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The software predicts individual total medical cost in the next year by generating predicted total
cost bands. By taking the median of the band, and summing across family members, I generate a
continuous measure of medical expenditure for the family for the next year. The average predicted
annual medical expenditure in the sample is $11,550, while the median is $6,250. As expected, the
distribution of this measure has a long right tail.
Since the data includes all employees, I can identify the department group for each employee.
Using this grouping, I can generate the share of each health plan in the department of the employee.
The share of plan j in individual i’s department at time t is defined as:
Peeri jt =
∑Dit
l=1 1{Planlit = j}
Dit
where Dit is the number of employees in i’s department at time t, and Planlit is the plan enrolled by
employee l in i’s department at time t. The peer measure could be further refined by additionally
separating the peer group by job family (faculty vs. administrative). The data does not lend itself
to such refinement, since some department are entirely administrative, while others have only a
handful of administrative staff, making peer groups too small for analysis.
In defining peer effects thus, I recognize that the peer group of the employee is not exogenously
determined. As employees are involved in the hiring decision of the department, the composition
of the department is not random. As a result, the estimates here do not identify the causation of
peer choices on employee plan choice. I will interpret the coefficient as associations between the
peer group and individual choices.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the entire sample. Compared to Aetna members, more
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young female employees join Aetna Wellness. Consistent with the youth of Aetna Wellness mem-
bers, they tend to have lower earnings compared to Aetna. The comparison of health shows that
compared to other plans, Aetna Wellness members and families are healthier, and the predicted to-
tal cost for them is lower. Aetna Wellness members also appear to have a lower medical utilization
intensity, as well as a lower predicted total medical cost than other plan members.
The summary statistics for new employees are presented in Table 4. The pattern is similar among
new employees. Aetna Wellness members tend to be younger compared to other plans, and they
earn significantly less than Aetna members. Based on the subsequent utilization, Aetna Wellness
families are healthier and are less intense users of medical services.
The summary statistics suggest that Aetna Wellness members are healthier. Furthermore, the
consistency of the pattern of choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna among all employees and
new employees suggest that peer suggestions play an important role. In the next section I discuss
the model of plan choice which informs the estimations which follow.
Model
When describing the plan choice decision of the individual employee, I am constrained by simi-
larity of Aetna Wellness and Aetna. In particular, since the co-insurance and copay are the same
for both plans across the year for in-network and out-of-network visits, on the margin, demand for
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medical services is the same for both plans. This lack of variability does not allow for identification
of a risk aversion coefficient. As a result, a model such as the one defined by Handel (2011) cannot
be estimated using the data on hand.
The model presented here will inform the reduced form analysis by describing the mechanisms
through which health and peer effects operate. I will use a variation of the Abaluck and Gruber
(2011) model.
The employee i is choosing among plans using a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility
for plan j at time t :
U(Ci jt) = −exp(−γ(Wi jt −Ci jt)) where Ci jt ∼ N(µ, σ2) (2.1)
Here, Wi jt is wealth and Ci jt is cost of insurance. Insurance costs are characterized by P jt, pre-
mium, and Mit, medical expenditure, and hassle associated with satisfying plan requirement and
learning about plan features, Hi jt.
Hi jt = f (F jt, Peersit, hit, ηt) where ηt ∼ N(H, σ2η) (2.2)
Ci jt = P jt + κMit + Hi jt1{Iit , Iit−1} (2.3)
The hassle of a plan can be affected by the plan features, peer group of the employee, and their
own/family health. Plan features, F jt, include choice of primary care physician (PCP) and com-
pletion of health risk questionnaire. Deviating from usual definition of peer effect, I assume that
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the peers inform the employee about the real burdens and benefits of the plan features. The peer
effect is captures by Peersit, and it is a vector of shares of peers in insurance plans. hit is the health
status of employee/family. I hypothesize that there are three avenues through which employees and
families with worse health have a higher cost to learning about health plans. First, having a more
regular relationship with a physician, they may be reluctant to experience changes to that relation-
ship. Second, they may be weary of additional medical visits and testing, even if the testing will
result in improved medical care. Third, they might perceive that a plan with emphasis on wellness
is not designed with their needs in mind. I am unable to differentiate between these three avenues
of effects.
Following the first order Taylor expansion of indirect utility, I derive the conditional logit model
of plan choice, where the utility of individual i from plan j is given by:
ui jt = α + δ0P jt + δ1E[Mi jt] + Peersitδ2 + δ3hit + δ4F jt + xitλ + i jt (2.4)
where xit is a vector if individual characteristics, E[Mit] is the expected medical expenditure for
individual i. To estimate the peer and health effects on plan choice, the coefficients of interest are
δ2 and δ3.
The identification of the peer and health effects has challenges. First, peer effects are recognized
in literature to have two problems. Reflectivity of peer choices occurs when a causality loop
exists, where friends affect each other’s choice, biasing estimates upwards. By using the new
employees as my preferred sample I break the causality loop. Because new employees make health
insurance choices after the traditional enrollment period, the choices of existing employee cannot
43
be affected by new employees. Another problem associated with peer effects is that peer groups
tend to be endogenous to individual characteristics. While I cannot overcome this problem in the
current context, compared to peer groups of friends, department peers tend to have fewer common
unobservable factors.
The second challenge to identification is the endogeneity of plan choice. The endogeneity arises
when the individual choice of plan is affected by the unobservable characteristics. The endogene-
ity results in a different pattern of utilization of health services. To overcome the endogeneity I
compare near identical plans. Aetna and Aetna Wellness have the coinsurance rates and physician
networks, so that I can confidently assume that the counterfactual and actual expenditure between
the two plans would be identical. Since, controlling for financial attributes, the only difference be-
tween Aetna Wellness and Aetna is the wellness features, the unobservable characteristics which
determine the choice between two plans reveal preferences over wellness features. Thus, peers and
health affect plan choice operate through individual preferences on the wellness features.
Results
Before proceeding with the estimation of the model, I need to determine the selection occurring
when looking at the sample of employees who choose insurance. To do this, I will estimate the
following binary choice model of insurance enrollment:
Pr(Insurance) = α0 + xitα1 + Peeritα2 + α3hit + year + it (2.5)
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where xit is a vector if individual characteristics, Peerst is a vector of shares of peers in insurance
plans, ht is the health status of employee/family. The analysis will be conducted for both the
entire sample, the subsample of employees with discontinued insurance, and the sample of new
employees.
The regression results are presented in Table 5. The first column of the table lists the coefficient
estimates for the entire sample. Overall, it appears that the total sample has substantial selection
occurring. The second column are the estimates for employees whose plan was discontinued. The
last column are the estimates for the new employees. Here, while some selection does occur, it
is smaller and less significant. This is further evidence that the sample of new employees is best
suited to estimate the model.
Pairwise Comparison
The analysis will begin with pairwise comparisons between Aetna Wellness and Aetna, and then
Aetna Wellness and the Third Plan. In the next section, a multinomial analysis will allow the inte-
gration of the entire choice set of employees. To estimate the binary choice relationship between
Aetna Wellness and the other plan of comparison, I adapt the model equation (4) and define the
probability of choice as:
Pr(AetnaWellness) = α + Peers jtδ2 + δ3hit + δ0P jt + δ1E[Mit] + xitλ + i jt (2.6)
where E[Mit] is the expected medical expenditure for the household. To estimate the effect of
health on plan choice, I will be using hit and E[Mit], as measured by the Charlson index, the
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resource utilization bands, and the predicted total costs. In particular, the ACG software generated
predicted total costs allows me to match the expected medical expenditure component of the model
closely.
Table 6 presents the results of the linear probability of choosing Aetna Wellness for the total
sample. The model is estimated using the various measures of health: medical resource utilization
intensity (columns (1) and (2)), predicted total cost (columns (3) and (4)), and the Charlson index
of comorbidities (columns (5) and (6)). The coefficients on interest are peer effect Aetna Wellness
and the measures of health. Since the peer effect is defined as the share of the department, it ranges
from 0 to 1. Therefore, the coefficient in column (2) can be interpreted as a 10 percentage points
rise in the Aetna Wellness enrollment in department increases own probability of enrolling in Aetna
Wellness by 2.2 percentage points. The health effect differs by the measures used. The probability
of enrolling in Aetna Wellness increases 1 pp with a point rise in the resource utilization, and
declines 2 pp with a point rise in the Charlson index.
Table 7 repeats the analysis for the subsample of employees with discontinued insurance. Here,
once again, each column represents a separate regression with one of the three measures of health.
Peer effect is significant, with a 10 pp rise in peer enrollment increasing own enrollment in Aetna
Wellness by 1.7 pp. While the effect of health is similar in magnitude and direction as in Table 6,
the estimates are not significant at conventional levels.
The estimates for the sample of new employees confirms the same trends in Table 6, however the
sample size sharply increases the standard errors resulting in lost statistical significance. The peer
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effect of Aetna Wellness enrollment is 1.0 pp, and a point rise in the Charlson index decreases the
probability of enrollment by 4 pp.
The model is next estimated as a logistic regression. Table 9 presents the results for the total
sample. A 10 pp rise in peer enrollment in Aetna Wellness increases own probability of enrollment
between 2.4 and 2.6 pp. A one point rise in the intensity of medical utilization increases the
probability of enrollment by 1 percentage point a point rise in the Charlson index decreases the
probability by 2 pp. For employees with discontinued insurance, in Table 10, the peer effect is
between 1.8 and 1.9 pp, while the Charlson index decreases the probability by 2 pp.
The preferred specification in presented in Table 11, limiting the sample of new employees. As the
sample size declines sharply, the increased noise of the standard errors does not allows for reliable
statistical inference, however, the magnitude and direction of the effect remain consistent with the
previous results. A 10 percentage point rise in the peer enrollment in Aetna Wellness increases own
probability of enrollment between 0.9 and 1.0 percentage points. While the intensity of medical
utilization does not affect probability of enrollment in this sample, the Charlson index does. A 1
point rise in the severity of medical conditions is associated with a 4 pp decrease in probability of
enrollment.
I next compare Aetna Wellness and the Third Plan. The comparison in this case is not as close.
The Third Plan had a different network, and a different coinsurance rate on the out-of-network
medical services compared to Aetna Wellness. A cursory comparison of the networks in the ge-
ographical area of the employer, however, yields only small differences between the networks.
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Since the Third Plan was discontinued in 2013, all analysis here is limited to pre-2013 sample, and
therefore precludes the subsample used in the previous comparison.
Table 12 contains the estimates of a linear probability of choice of Aetna Wellness compared to
the Third Plan. The peer effect is similar in magnitude and sign to the previous analysis, with a 10
pp rise in peer enrollment in Aetna Wellness increasing own probability of enrollment between 2.3
pp and 2.5 pp. A one point rise in the intensity of medical resource utilization and the Charlson
index lead to a 1pp decline in probability of enrollment. Table 13 present the estimates for the
subsample of new employees, and the results are near identical to the comparison between Aetna
Wellness and Aetna.
The results of the logit specification are in Table 14 and 15. As before, the dependent variable
is the probability of choosing Aetna Wellness, when faced with the choice with the Third Plan.
The peer effect has similar magnitude and sign, with a 10 pp rise in the peer enrollment in Aetna
Wellness increasing own probability of enrollment by 2.6 to 2.8 pp. The probability declines by 1
pp for a one point rise in the medical utilization intensity, and declines by 2 pp for a point rise in
the Charlson index.
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Extended Choice Set
The pairwise comparison of the health plans, however, assumes independence among the alter-
natives. If this assumption does not hold, then the relevant choice set are all health plan options
faced by the employee. In this section, I will re-estimate the model using a multinomial logit
specification and a mixed logit specification.
A multinomial logit model is used when the regressors are individual specific. The probability of
choosing Aetna Wellness from the choice set is defined as:
pi j =
exp(x′iβ j)∑m
l=1 exp(x′iβl)
(2.7)
where xi are the individual specific regressors, and j = {plan choice set}. To ensure identification
β j is set to zero for one of the categories, though the average marginal effect can be estimated for
all categories.
In the section describing the plans, I described the Aetna 80/20 plan which was in-
tended for pre-retirees and retirees. In the first multinomial logit, I will consider the
choice set including the Aetna 80/20 plan. Thus, in Table 16, the choice set is j =
{Aetna Wellness, Aetna, Aetna 80/20, Third Plan}. Because of this definition of the choice set, the
analysis is limited to 2007-2012 time period, and excludes the subsample of employees with dis-
continued plan. Aetna Wellness is the base category in all regressions, but the second, fourth, and
sixth column present the marginal effects of the regressors on the probability of choosing Aetna
Wellness only. The estimates for peer effect and health are quantitatively and qualitatively identical
to the previous results. However, looking at the coefficient for Aetna 80/20, I see large standard
49
errors and small coefficients, which is due to the very small sample of employees enrolled in the
plan. In the following regression, presented in Table 17, I drop Aetna 80/20 from consideration
and add no insurance, and my coefficients are largely unchanged for the probability of choice of
Aetna Wellness.
In Table 18, I estimate the multinomial logit model for new employees. The choice set is
j = {Aetna Wellness, Aetna, Third Plan, and no insurance}, and the addition of no insurance to
the choice set has a significant impact on both peer and health effect. Peer effects range from 1.3
pp to 2.5 pp in this estimate, depending on which measure of health is used. A $1,000 rise in the
predicted total future medical cost increases the probability of enrolling in the plan by 9 pp. Given
that the sample used here includes all new employees who chose not to have insurance, the changes
in estimates can be attributed to this choice.
While the multinomial logit allows a comparison of a wider choice set, it makes use of the ob-
served choices of employees. It does not incorporate the attributes of the alternatives in the choice
sets, and limits regressors to the employee characteristics. In this dataset, however, I have more
complete information about the characteristics of all the alternatives in the choice set. To take
advantage of this information, I use a mixed logit specification, described as alternative specific
conditional logit in Stata. Expanding on McFadden (1973), Cameron and Trivedi (2010) describe
the alternative specific conditional logit as combining both plan characteristics and individual at-
tributes, defining the probability of choice of plan j:
pi j =
exp(z′i jβ + x
′
iγ j)∑m
l=1 exp(z′ilβ + x
′
iγl)
(2.8)
where
j = {plan choice set}
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zi j = {premium, deductible, peer effects}
x′i = {demographics, family health}
I estimate the mixed logit using the alternative specific conditional logit command in Stata R©.
Table 19 presents the results from the mixed logit regression with the choice set of Aetna Wellness,
Aetna, Third Plan, and no plan. In this table, each section divided by a line is a separate regression
specification. The columns, as before, separate the results by sample. The first two columns reflect
the estimates for the total sample, while the last two columns limit the sample of new employees.
Only the coefficient of interest are listed from each regression. The marginal effects are calculated
manually, and the significance can be judged by the coefficient. Looking at the second and fourth
column, the peer effect for Aetna Wellness is somewhat larger from the previous estimates, ranging
from 4.4 pp for the first specification to 5.9 pp in the last specification. While the health measures
have changed in magnitude as well, the results are unreliable as the coefficients are not significantly
different from zero. Table 20 repeats the analysis for the choice set faced by the employees with
discontinued insurance, that is Aetna Wellness, Aetna, and no insurance. The coefficients are
similar in magnitude and sign.
Robustness of Results
In all of the above estimates, I estimate the contemporaneous peer effects. For new employees
this is particularly appropriate since when choosing among plans, they would discuss their current
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experiences with their colleagues. How would the estimates change if the peer effect was intro-
duced with a lag? Table 21 has the estimates from the regression with lagged peer effects for new
employees. The lagged peer effects are not significant for in any of the specifications, confirming
that the new employees indeed rely on the current experiences of their colleagues.
Does the reliance on peer experiences change in the years after the introduction of the Wellness
plan? Table 22 estimates the logit model of comparison between Aetna Wellness and Aetna, in-
cluding a peer and time interaction. The first two columns present the results for the entire sample,
while the last two focus on the sample of new employees. In the second and fourth columns I
have estimates the marginal effects of the individual peer-year interactions on the probability of
enrolling in Aetna Wellness. In the total sample, the peer effect is at 7.0 pp in 2008, the first year
of introduction, and steadily declines to 2.2 pp by 2012. For the sample of new employees, a simi-
lar decline can be seen, though the large standard errors do not allow me to rely on the result. These
suggest that as the Wellness plan becomes better known, the value of peer feedback or information
declines.
Finally, a falsification test will allow me to rule out spurious peer effects. To check the robustness
of peer effects, I have randomly assigned the peer group to the employee. The estimates of the
logit model are presented in Table 23. As expected, all the coefficients are close to zero and
insignificant for both total and new employee sample. This confirms that the estimates seen in the
previous tables are not spurious.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper studies the introduction of a wellness program as an optional part of health insurance.
Many employers and insurers are turning to wellness programs as a means of slowing the rising
costs of health insurance by making the patient more mindful of their health and medical services
utilization. While many employers introduce these programs as a mandatory part of all insurance,
I study the program in the voluntary context.
Aetna Wellness was introduced by a large self-insured employer to its health insurance options.
Aetna Wellness was based on and introduced in parallel to an existing Aetna plan. Despite lower
premium and deductible, employees actively chose plans other than Aetna Wellness. I look at two
factors affecting the choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna: peer choices and family health.
To measure the effect of peer choices, I count the share of employee’s department enrolled in each
plan. To measure the family health status, I use three measures: the Charlson index of comorbidi-
ties uses medical claims to isolate the presence of 22 severe medical conditions, and rates them
according to mortality; the Johns Hopkins ACG software allows me to generate two measures of
medical service utilization on the basis of medical and pharmaceutical claims, by age and gender.
The resource utilization bands measure the current intensity of medical utilization by individual.
The predicted total cost range reflects the expected medical costs the individual.
Since Aetna Wellness and Aetna differ only on the wellness program, I ascribe the choice to
preferences over it. I use two subsamples to avoid the choice bias introduced by switching costs:
new employees, and employees whose health plan was discontinued in 2013. I find that a 10 pp
53
rise in the peer enrollment in Aetna Wellness increases own probability of enrollment between 0.9
pp to 5.9 pp. Family health status has a different effect depending on the measure used. Using
the resource utilization band, which has a more even distribution across employees, I find that
a 1 point rise in the index increases the probability of enrollment in Aetna Wellness up to 3 pp.
When using the Charlson family index, which has a skewed distribution towards the more severe
medical conditions, I find that a 1 point rise in the index reduces the probability of enrollment in
Aetna Wellness up to 5 pp. For every $1,000 increase in the predicted medical expenditure, the
probability of enrollment increases by 9 pp.
The results suggest that lack of information and experience about the wellness features is a ma-
jor impediment in the adoption of the program. As the program is increasingly implemented by
employers, state and regional governments, the effectiveness will increase if employees are better
informed about the true costs and benefits of the program, for example, the Virginia Wellness Is
Now (WIN).
The results also suggest that those who join the program tend to be generally healthier, but heavy
users of medical services. The resource utilization band, which has a wider distribution among all
employees, suggests that Wellness members are not the non-users – they are light to medium users
of medical services. However, as the Charlson index shows, those with more severe permanent
medical conditions tend to avoid the Wellness program. A more effective program would reach
those with more severe permanent medical conditions.
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2.2 Appendix
The sample used in the dissertation tracks 13,450 employees across an average 4.2 years. Of those
employees 9,632 employees enroll in one of the health insurance plans during some period of the
panel. The remaining 29% of employees choose not to enroll in health insurance. These employees
may be on spousal health insurance, though this cannot be ascertained due to lack of data.
During the length of the panel 4,716 employees were hired. A new employee is defined as an
employee who started employment during the panel year. This implies that the new employee
did not participate in the benefit selection during the open enrollment period. A new employee
becomes a non-new employee on January 1 of the calendar year following the date of hire.
Of 4,716 new employees, 1,771 select one of the available health insurance plans. The remaining
2,918 (about 62.09%) do not select a plan, which is much higher than the rate of no-insurance
selection among non-new employees. To better understand the sample of new employees who do
not select health insurance, I look at their composition.
Among the 2,918 new employees who do not select health insurance, 787 have only one year
of observation in all the years of the sample. These may have been temporary or seasonal em-
ployees. These employees are much more likely not to select health insurance or have alternative
insurance. Of new employees with 2 or more years of observations, 2,141 did not select health
insurance (about 57.22% of new employees with 2 or more years of employment) in the first year
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of employment.
Since the data is administrative, the high rate of no insurance plan could be due to choice of
employee or poor quality of data entry. To test this hypothesis, I look at the rate of health insurance
choice in their second year of employment by new employees. Of 3,662 new employees in their
second year of employment 2,106 select a health insurance plan (57.71%), while 1,556 (42.59%)
do not select a health insurance plan.
There are 12,420 non-new employees in the sample, of which 9,565 select insurance, while 4,698
have no insurance in some year during the length of the panel. Thus, among the non-new em-
ployees, approximately 21.94% of the sample does not choose insurance. Comparing the new
employees to non-new employees, in the initial year of employment, new employees are around
36 percentage points (or about 2.5 times) more likely not to enroll in health insurance. In their sec-
ond year of employment, new employees are 21 percentage points (or about 2 times) more likely
not to enroll in health insurance.
Thus, new employees who do not select health insurance are substantially different from those
who do select health insurance. This suggests that the missing insurance information in the data
is not a data entry error, since such error would yield a more randomized assignment of insurance
status. The high rate of no insurance in the second year of employment further supports this
conclusion, as it suggests that the choice is often consistent year after year.
Table 25 shows the summary statistics for the new employees by insurance status and employment
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type. Among the long term employees, those with no insurance tend to be younger, with fewer
dependents than those with insurance. This sample contains fewer females, and a larger share
of academic employees, who earn a lower wage. Temporary employees display a similar trend,
though a much higher share has no insurance. Uninsured and insured employees differ most in
their job type. 85% of the uninsured have an academic job, while only 50% of the insured are in
that job type.
Table 26 presents the estimates of a linear probability model of insurance enrollment. The depen-
dent variable is a dummy which is 1 when the observation is enrolled in insurance. The coefficient
on the dummy for new employees suggests that they are 19 percentage points less likely to enroll
in health insurance. This is consistent with the comparison of raw averages in the second year of
employment, and suggests that most of the difference in the insurance enrollment between new and
existing employees can be explained by the characteristics of new employees.
The number of dependents affects the choice to enroll in health insurance as well. With the
omitted category as no dependents, employees with 1 or more dependents are more likely to take up
insurance. When interacting the number of dependents with gender, this relationship is weakened.
Female employees are less likely to take up insurance if they have dependants. Thus, a female
employee with one dependent is 10 percentage points less likely to enroll in insurance than a male
employee with one dependent, suggesting that spousal health insurance is a major reason for lack
of insurance among female employees.
While new employees appear to be much more likely to not enroll in health insurance, some of the
57
difference can be explained by their characteristics. This tendency not to enroll in health insurance
continues in their second year of employment, suggesting that the enrollment data in the first year
is not spuriously missing.
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Table 2.1: Plan Comparison for a Family, All Plans 2012
Aetna Wellness Aetna Third HSA Aetna 80/20
Premium 3515 4555 3828 3615 6133
Deductible
In Network 0 500 300 2400 1100
Out of Network 800 900 900 4800 1100
Out of Pocket Maximum
In Network 4000 4100 4100 5000 7100
Out of Network 7000 7100 7100 7000 7100
Coinsurance
In Network 90 90 90 90 80
Out of Network 80 80 70 80 80
Network Aetna Aetna PHCS Aetna Aetna
Must choose PCP Yes No No No No
Enhanced Wellness Program Yes No No No No
Table 2.2: Enrollment across years by numbers
Aetna Well Aetna Aetna 80/20 Third HSA
2007 . 971 269 3166 .
2008 445 1091 308 3748 16
2009 680 1004 301 3527 17
2010 959 909 257 3051 18
2011 1324 887 236 2719 22
2012 1647 859 229 2428 18
2013 2621 1017 152 . 26
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Figure 2.1: Enrollment in Plans, 2007-2012
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Aetna Wellness Aetna Third Plan All
Age 43.52 47.60 45.29 46.30
(11.72) (11.83) (11.42) (13.91)
Female .56 .44 .51 .50
(.49) (.50) (.50) (.50)
No. of dependents 1.13 1.25 1.27 .91
(1.30) (1.30) (1.27) (1.09)
Salary 64166 84224 59126 63201
(46992) (56193) (34056) (41901)
Past Medical Expenditure 9188 11054 8815 6959
(19373) (17392) (14028) (13372)
Charlson Index .27 .39 .32 .34
(.77) (.88) (.64) (.71)
Medical Utilization Intensity 3.67 4.62 4.86 3.24
(1.70) (2.46) (2.56) (2.55)
Predicted Total Medical Cost (1000’s) 10.45 16.44 15.82 11.24
(9.92) (16.94) (15.34) (12.67)
Gym Membership .09 .18 .18 .15
(.27) (.35) (.36) (.32)
Aetna Wellness Share in Dept. .25 .14 .10 .14
(.16) (.14) (.08) (.11)
n 3770 2374 5375 13450
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Figure 2.2: Aetna v. Aetna Wellness: Cost Difference
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: New Employees
Aetna Wellness Aetna No Insurance All
Age 35.24 37.22 35.77 36.37
(9.50) (9.66) (9.82) (11.18)
Female .47 .45 .40 .44
(.50) (.50) (.49) (.49)
No. of dependents .40 .55 .05 .21
(.85) (1.08) (.34) (.66)
Salary 57253 75472 45952 50970
(39530) (60887) (30138) (36664)
Medical Expenditure 3443 5846 1419
(9689) (22697) (7736)
Charlson Index .09 .28 .14
(.40) (1.04) (.62)
Medical Utilization Intensity 2.93 3.64 1.22
(2.12) (2.82) (2.13)
Predicted Total Medical Cost (1000’s) 6.81 10.98 4.32
(8.49) (21.56) (8.75)
Gym Membership .02 .11 .09 .07
(.13) (.30) (.30) (.24)
Aetna Wellness Share in Dept. .19 .11 .11
(.16) (.13) (.14)
n 756 284 2862 4603
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Figure 2.3: Switching into Aetna Wellness
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Table 2.5: Linear probability model of insurance take up.
(1) (2) (3)
All Employees Discontinued Plan New Employees
Age .00*** .00*** –.00***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Female .04*** .03*** .08***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
No. of Dependents .01*** .03*** –.06***
(.00) (.00) (.01)
Salary .04*** .05*** .03*
(.00) (.00) (.01)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –.01 .04 –.03
(.02) (.03) (.06)
Peer Effect Aetna –.05 .01 .08
(.02) (.05) (.07)
Peer Effect Third .02 –.87 –.05
(.02) (1.13) (.04)
Medical Utilization Intensity .05*** –.04*** .16***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Const .08* .32*** .01
(.04) (.04) (.13)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .80 .93 .50
N 48913 2513 3169
r2 .22 .23 .50
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant
at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.6: Linear probability model of choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna for total
sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peer Effect Aetna –.29*** –.14** –.30*** –.14** –.25*** –.13*
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .81*** .22*** .82*** .23*** .84*** .24***
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.04)
Medical Utilization Intensity –.02*** .01**
(.00) (.00)
Predicted Total Cost –.00*** –.00
(.00) (.00)
Charlson Index –.04*** –.02*
(.01) (.01)
Past Med Exp .02***
(.00)
ln(Cost) –.25*** –.25*** –.24***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Age –.01*** –.01*** –.00***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Female .07*** .07*** .09***
(.01) (.01) (.02)
No. of Dependents .12*** .12*** .11***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Salary –.03*** –.03*** –.03**
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Const .47*** 2.60*** .44*** 2.60*** .40*** 2.24***
(.02) (.11) (.01) (.11) (.01) (.12)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .53 .58 .53 .58 .53 .55
N 15551 13815 15551 13815 13909 11901
r2 .11 .24 .11 .24 .11 .24
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5
percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.7: Linear probability model of choice between Aetna
Wellness and Aetna for subsample of employees with discon-
tinued insurance.
(1) (2) (3)
Peer Effect Aetna –.09 –.08 –.08
(.12) (.12) (.12)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .17* .17* .17*
(.08) (.08) (.08)
Medical Utilization Intensity .01
(.01)
Predicted Total Cost .00
(.00)
Charlson Index –.01
(.01)
ln(Cost) –.21*** –.21*** –.21***
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Age .00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Female .09*** .09*** .09***
(.02) (.02) (.02)
No. of Dependents .12*** .12*** .12***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Salary –.00 –.00 –.00
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Const 1.98*** 2.00*** 1.99***
(.17) (.17) (.17)
Year Fixed Effects No No No
Dep. Var. Mean .71 .71 .71
N 1542 1542 1542
r2 .09 .09 .09
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.8: Linear probability model of choice between Aetna
Wellness and Aetna for new employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Peer Effect Aetna –.02 –.02 –.00
(.12) (.12) (.12)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .10 .10 .11
(.09) (.09) (.09)
Medical Utilization Intensity .00
(.01)
Predicted Total Cost –.00
(.00)
Charlson Index –.04
(.03)
ln(Cost) –.34*** –.33*** –.34***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Age –.00 –.00 –.00
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Female –.04 –.04 –.04
(.03) (.03) (.03)
No. of Dependents .25*** .25*** .25***
(.03) (.02) (.02)
Salary –.13*** –.13*** –.13***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Const 4.22*** 4.20*** 4.18***
(.31) (.31) (.31)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .80 .80 .80
N 881 881 871
r2 .21 .21 .22
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.9: Logit marginal effect on choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna with total
sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effect Aetna –.74** –.14** –.72** –.13** –.68* –.13*
(.28) (.05) (.28) (.05) (.29) (.05)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness 1.32*** .24*** 1.34*** .25*** 1.39*** .26***
(.22) (.04) (.22) (.04) (.23) (.04)
Medical Utilization Intensity .04** .01**
(.01) (.00)
Predicted Total Cost –.00 –.00
(.00) (.00)
Charlson Index –.09* –.02*
(.04) (.01)
Past Medical Exp. .09*** .02***
(.02) (.00)
ln(Cost) –1.30*** –.24*** –1.28*** –.24*** –1.23*** –.23***
(.06) (.01) (.06) (.01) (.06) (.01)
Age –.03*** –.01*** –.03*** –.01*** –.02*** –.00***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Female .36*** .07*** .37*** .07*** .45*** .08***
(.08) (.01) (.08) (.01) (.08) (.01)
No. of Dependents .59*** .11*** .63*** .12*** .56*** .11***
(.05) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.05) (.01)
Salary –.19*** –.04*** –.19*** –.04*** –.15** –.03**
(.05) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.05) (.01)
Const 11.01*** 10.95*** 9.08***
(.66) (.66) (.69)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .58 .58 .55
N 13815 13815 13815 13815 11901 11901
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.10: Logit marginal effect on choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna for employees
with discontinued insurance.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effect Aetna –.50 –.09 –.48 –.09 –.50 –.09
(.63) (.12) (.63) (.12) (.64) (.12)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .97* .18* 1.00* .19* 1.03* .19*
(.43) (.08) (.43) (.08) (.43) (.08)
Medical Utilization Intensity .06 .01
(.07) (.01)
Predicted Total Cost .01 .00
(.01) (.00)
Charlson Index –.10 –.02
(.07) (.01)
Past Medical Exp. .14** .03**
(.05) (.01)
ln(Cost) –1.09*** –.20*** –1.09*** –.20*** –1.11*** –.21***
(.10) (.02) (.10) (.02) (.11) (.02)
Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Female .46*** .08*** .46*** .09*** .45*** .08***
(.12) (.02) (.12) (.02) (.12) (.02)
No. of Dependents .68*** .13*** .67*** .12*** .64*** .12***
(.08) (.01) (.08) (.01) (.08) (.01)
Salary –.02 –.00 –.02 –.00 –.02 –.00
(.06) (.01) (.06) (.01) (.06) (.01)
Const 7.67*** 7.79*** 6.92***
(.93) (.93) (.97)
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
mean .71 .71 .71
N 1542 1542 1542 1542 1537 1537
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.11: Logit marginal effect on choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna for new em-
ployees.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effect Aetna –.35 –.04 –.35 –.04 –.24 –.03
(.90) (.11) (.90) (.11) (.92) (.11)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .81 .10 .82 .10 .77 .09
(.82) (.10) (.82) (.10) (.83) (.10)
Medical Utilization Intensity .01 .00
(.05) (.01)
Predicted Total Cost –.00 –.00
(.01) (.00)
Charlson Index –.33 –.04*
(.17) (.02)
Med. Expenditure .15* .02*
(.07) (.01)
ln(Cost) –2.26*** –.28*** –2.26*** –.28*** –2.30*** –.28***
(.23) (.02) (.23) (.02) (.23) (.02)
Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Female –.29 –.04 –.29 –.04 –.29 –.04
(.20) (.02) (.20) (.02) (.20) (.02)
No. of Dependents 1.94*** .24*** 1.95*** .24*** 1.92*** .24***
(.27) (.03) (.27) (.03) (.27) (.03)
Salary –1.04*** –.13*** –1.04*** –.13*** –1.03*** –.13***
(.21) (.02) (.21) (.02) (.21) (.02)
Const 26.49*** 26.41*** 25.61***
(2.76) (2.77) (2.79)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .80 .80 .80
N 881 881 881 881 870 870
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.12: Linear probability model of choice between Aetna
Wellness and Third Plan for all employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Peer Effect Third Plan –.30*** –.30*** –.25***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .23*** .23*** .25***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Medical Utilization Intensity .00
(.00)
Predicted Total Cost .00
(.00)
Charlson Index –.01*
(.00)
Past Med Exp .01***
(.00)
ln(Cost) –.10*** –.10*** –.08***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Age –.00*** –.00*** –.00***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Female .03*** .03*** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
No. of Dependents .02*** .02*** .02***
(.01) (.00) (.00)
Salary .06*** .06*** .07***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Const .43*** .43*** .10
(.09) (.09) (.09)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .33 .33 .31
N 23942 23942 21441
r2 .34 .34 .37
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.13: Linear probability model of choice between Aetna
Wellness and Third Plan for new employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Peer Effect Third Plan –.15 –.15 –.18*
(.08) (.08) (.08)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .18 .18 .17
(.10) (.10) (.10)
Medical Utilization Intensity –.01*
(.01)
Predicted Total Cost –.00
(.00)
Charlson Index –.01
(.03)
ln(Cost) –.13*** –.13*** –.13***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Age –.00 –.00 –.00
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Female –.05* –.05* –.04
(.03) (.03) (.03)
No. of Dependents .07** .06* .05*
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Salary .11*** .11*** .11***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Const .24 .20 .19
(.34) (.34) (.35)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .71 .71 .71
N 986 986 975
r2 .27 .27 .27
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.14: Logit marginal effect of choice between Aetna Wellness and Third Plan for all
employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effect Third –1.72*** –.27*** –1.71*** –.27*** –1.53*** –.22***
(.18) (.03) (.18) (.03) (.20) (.03)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness 1.22*** .19*** 1.22*** .19*** 1.44*** .21***
(.22) (.03) (.22) (.03) (.24) (.03)
Medical Utilization Intensity .01 .00
(.01) (.00)
Predicted Total Cost .00 .00
(.00) (.00)
Charlson Index –.09* –.01*
(.04) (.01)
Past Medical Exp. .07** .01**
(.02) (.00)
ln(Cost) –.72*** –.11*** –.71*** –.11*** –.65*** –.10***
(.06) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.06) (.01)
Age –.04*** –.01*** –.04*** –.01*** –.03*** –.00***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Female .27*** .04*** .27*** .04*** .40*** .06***
(.06) (.01) (.06) (.01) (.07) (.01)
No. of Dependents .17*** .03*** .18*** .03*** .19*** .03***
(.04) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.04) (.01)
Salary .64*** .10*** .64*** .10*** .72*** .11***
(.07) (.01) (.07) (.01) (.07) (.01)
Const –2.04* –2.05* –4.72***
(.81) (.81) (.89)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 21537 21537 21537 21537 19136 19136
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.15: Logit marginal effect of choice between Aetna Wellness and Third Plan for
new employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effect Third –.92 –.14 –.94 –.14 –1.13* –.17*
(.51) (.08) (.51) (.08) (.51) (.08)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness 1.89* .28* 1.84* .28* 1.75* .26*
(.88) (.13) (.88) (.13) (.88) (.13)
Medical Utilization Intensity –.08* –.01*
(.04) (.01)
Predicted Total Cost –.01 –.00
(.01) (.00)
Charlson Index –.13 –.02
(.22) (.03)
Medical Expenditure .04 .01
(.06) (.01)
ln(Cost) –.82*** –.12*** –.78*** –.12*** –.79*** –.12***
(.19) (.03) (.18) (.03) (.19) (.03)
Age –.01 –.00 –.01 –.00 –.01 –.00
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Female –.37* –.06* –.34* –.05* –.30 –.04
(.17) (.03) (.17) (.03) (.17) (.03)
No. of Dependents .42* .06* .34 .05 .27 .04
(.18) (.03) (.18) (.03) (.18) (.03)
Salary .85*** .13*** .84*** .13*** .87*** .13***
(.20) (.03) (.20) (.03) (.20) (.03)
Const –3.26 –3.58 –4.02
(2.39) (2.40) (2.45)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 965 965 965 965 952 952
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5
percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.16: Multinomial logit comparing Aetna Wellness to Aetna, Aetna 80/20, and Third Plan for all
employees.
Medical Utilization Intensity Predicted Total Cost Charlson Index
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Pr(Aetna Wellness) (base category)
Peer Effect Aetna .00 –.05 .00 –.05 .00 –.04
(.) (.04) (.) (.04) (.) (.04)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .00 .17*** .00 .17*** .00 .18***
(.) (.03) (.) (.03) (.) (.03)
Peer Effect Third .00 –.20*** .00 –.20*** .00 –.18***
(.) (.02) (.) (.02) (.) (.02)
Health Measure .00 .00*** .00 .00 .00 –.00
(.) (.00) (.) (.00) (.) (.00)
Pr(Aetna)
Peer Effect Aetna .87* .86* .87*
(.34) (.34) (.36)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –1.16*** –1.18*** –1.27***
(.28) (.28) (.30)
Peer Effect Third .58* .56* .49
(.24) (.24) (.25)
Health Measure –.06*** –.00 .05
(.01) (.00) (.04)
Pr(Aetna 80/20)
Peer Effect Aetna .59 .57 .39
(.64) (.63) (.66)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –1.36 –1.45* –1.47*
(.74) (.72) (.73)
Peer Effect Third .84 .78 .72
(.46) (.46) (.47)
Health Measure –.30*** –.01* .01
(.04) (.00) (.07)
Pr(Third)
Peer Effect Aetna .24 .24 .12
(.27) (.27) (.28)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –1.24*** –1.25*** –1.43***
(.22) (.22) (.24)
Peer Effect Third 1.74*** 1.74*** 1.61***
(.18) (.18) (.20)
Health Measure –.01 –.00 .02
(.01) (.00) (.04)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 27432 27432 27432 27432 25505 25505
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Demographic variables include age, gender, number of dependents, salary. All specifications also control
for log of sum of premium and deductible. Each pair of columns represents a specification using a different
measure of health. The first pair of columns use medical utilization intensity, the second pair of columns use
predicted total cost, and the last pair of columns use the Charlson index.
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Table 2.17: Multinomial logit comparing Aetna Wellness to Aetna and Third Plan, and no plan for all em-
ployees
Medical Utilization Intensity Predicted Total Cost Charlson Index
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Pr(Aetna Wellness) (base category)
Peer Effect Aetna .00 –.05 .00 –.04 .00 –.03
(.) (.03) (.) (.03) (.) (.04)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .00 .16*** .00 .16*** .00 .21***
(.) (.02) (.) (.03) (.) (.03)
Peer Effect Third .00 –.15*** .00 –.14*** .00 –.15***
(.) (.02) (.) (.02) (.) (.02)
Health Measure .00 .02*** .00 .01*** .00 –.01*
(.) (.00) (.) (.00) (.) (.01)
Pr(Aetna)
Peer Effect Aetna .75* .73* .70*
(.33) (.34) (.35)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –1.40*** –1.42*** –1.53***
(.28) (.28) (.29)
Peer Effect Third .41 .39 .32
(.23) (.23) (.24)
Health Measure .00 .00 .12**
(.01) (.00) (.04)
Pr(Third Plan)
Peer Effect Aetna .20 .17 .04
(.27) (.27) (.29)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –1.38*** –1.41*** –1.58***
(.23) (.23) (.24)
Peer Effect Third 1.66*** 1.63*** 1.53***
(.18) (.18) (.20)
Health Measure .02* .00 .06
(.01) (.00) (.04)
Pr(No plan)
Peer Effect Aetna .65* .42 .31
(.28) (.29) (.33)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –.69** –.92*** –1.67***
(.23) (.24) (.29)
Peer Effect Third .76*** .62** –.05
(.19) (.20) (.24)
Health Measure –1.01*** –.20*** .03
(.02) (.01) (.06)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 33269 33269 33269 33269 26423 26423
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Demographic variables include age, gender, number of dependents, salary. All specifications also control
for log of sum of premium and deductible. Each pair of columns represents a specification using a different
measure of health. The first pair of columns use medical utilization intensity, the second pair of columns use
predicted total cost, and the last pair of columns use the Charlson index.
74
Table 2.18: Multinomial logit comparing Aetna Wellness to Aetna, Third Plan, and no plan for new employ-
ees.
Medical Utilization Intensity Predicted Total Cost Charlson Index
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Pr(Aetna Wellness) (base category)
Peer Effect Aetna .00 –.03 .00 –.01 .00 –.01
(.) (.07) (.) (.09) (.) (1.99)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .00 .13* .00 .08 .00 .25
(.) (.06) (.) (.08) (.) (.77)
Peer Effect Third .00 –.03 .00 –.07 .00 –.07
(.) (.05) (.) (.06) (.) (.79)
Health Measure .00 –.00 .00 .10*** .00 –.04
(.) (.01) (.) (.00) (.) (1.18)
Pr(Aetna)
Peer Effect Aetna –.44 –.38 –.53
(.90) (.89) (.90)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –.93 –.94 –.96
(.79) (.78) (.79)
Peer Effect Third –.75 –.76 –.73
(.62) (.61) (.62)
Health Measure –.01 .01 .29
(.04) (.01) (.16)
Pr(Third Plan)
Peer Effect Aetna .84 .84 .67
(.84) (.81) (.85)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –1.59 –1.79* –1.54
(.87) (.86) (.87)
Peer Effect Third 1.08* .77 1.20*
(.54) (.52) (.54)
Health Measure .07* .02* .10
(.04) (.01) (.19)
Pr(No plan)
Peer Effect Aetna –40.77 –.09 –345.13
(15473.06) (.68) (49777.49)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness 113.29 .23 88.38
(19099.74) (.55) (16943.74)
Peer Effect Third 173.04 .69 121.32
(18723.81) (.41) (17557.45)
Health Measure –237.17 –1.11*** 33.09
(12587.96) (.06) (28521.09)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2305 2305 2305 2305 1129 1129
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Demographic variables include age, gender, number of dependents, salary. All specifications also control
for log of sum of premium and deductible. Each pair of columns represents a specification using a different
measure of health. The first pair of columns use medical utilization intensity, the second pair of columns use
predicted total cost, and the last pair of columns use the Charlson index.
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Table 2.19: Alternative specific conditional logit comparing
Aetna Wellness, Aetna, Third Plan, and no plan.
Total Sample New Employees
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer effect Aetna Wellness 1.61*** .18 2.82*** .44
(.06) (.08) (.25) (.27)
Medical Utilization Intensity –.03*** .02 –.06 .05
(.01) (.01) (.04) (.03)
Peer effect Aetna Wellness 1.57*** .18 1.61*** .28
(.06) (.07) (.17) (.11)
Predicted Total Cost –.00* –.00 .02* .01
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Peer effect Aetna Wellness 1.61*** .22 2.92*** .59
(.08) (.08) (.25) (.15)
Family health –.15** .07 –.31* .23
(.05) (.02) (.15) (.06)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Demographic variables include age, gender, number of depen-
dents, salary. All specifications also control for log of sum of
premium and deductible.
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Table 2.20: Alternative specific conditional logit comparing
Aetna Wellness, Aetna, and no plan, 2013 choice set.
Total Sample Discontinued Plan
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer effect Aetna Wellness .37* .07 .50* .11
(.14) (.02) (.25) (.01)
Medical Utilization Intensity –.01 .01 –.01 .02
(.03) (.00) (.05) (.00)
Peer effect Aetna Wellness .28* .06 .49* .11
(.13) (.01) (.25) (.01)
Predicted Total Cost –.00 .00 .01 .00
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Peer effect Aetna Wellness .80*** .16 .83** .18
(.19) (.02) (.28) (.02)
Family Health –.04 .07 –.07 .07
(.03) (.01) (.05) (.01)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Demographic variables include age, gender, number of depen-
dents, salary. All specifications also control for log of sum of
premium and deductible.
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Table 2.21: Logit marginal effect of choice between Aetna Wellness and Aetna
with lagged peer effects for new employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effect Aetna –.83 –.10 –.84 –.10 –.77 –.09
(.57) (.07) (.57) (.07) (.56) (.07)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –.47 –.06 –.47 –.06 –.59 –.07
(.63) (.08) (.63) (.08) (.64) (.08)
Medical Utilization Intensity .01 .00
(.05) (.01)
Predicted Total Cost –.00 –.00
(.01) (.00)
Charlson Index –.33 –.04
(.19) (.02)
Med. Expenditure .17* .02*
(.07) (.01)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .80 .80 .80
N 849 849 849 849 838 838
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Signifi-
cant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Demographic variables include age, gender, number of dependents, salary. All
specifications also control for log of sum of premium and deductible.
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Table 2.22: Logit marginal effects of choice between Aetna Wellness
and Aetna, with year and peer effect interactions.
Total Sample New Employees
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effects Aetna –.74** –.28
(.28) (.91)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness 3.70*** 3.97
(.64) (2.73)
Medical Utilization Intensity .04** .01
(.01) (.05)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness * Year
2008 .00 .70*** .00 .62
(.) (.12) (.) (.36)
2009 –2.10*** .32** .25 .52
(.60) (.10) (5.28) (.48)
2010 –2.46*** .25** –4.36 –.05
(.69) (.08) (3.25) (.24)
2011 –2.31*** .27*** –3.77 .02
(.67) (.07) (3.06) (.14)
2012 –2.51*** .22*** –3.03 .09
(.68) (.06) (3.01) (.14)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .58 .80
N 13815 13815 881 881
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. *
Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 2.23: Logit marginal effects of choice between Aetna Well-
ness and Aetna, random peer assignment.
All Employees New Employees
Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Peer Effects Aetna –.03 –.01 .60 .08
(.09) (.02) (.50) (.06)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness .16* .03* –.00 –.00
(.07) (.01) (.32) (.04)
Medical Utilization Intensity .04*** .01*** .00 .00
(.01) (.00) (.05) (.01)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Var. Mean .58 .79
N 12405 12405 792 792
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Table 2.24: Summary Statistics: New Employees
Longer Term Employees Temporary Employees
No Insurance Insurance No Insurance Insurance
Mean / Std. Dev. Mean / Std. Dev. Mean / Std. Dev.. Mean / Std. Dev.
Age 35.89 37.45 35.43 36.61
(10.01) (12.89) (9.31) (13.68)
Female .42 .50 .37 .44
(.49) (.50) (.48) (.49)
Dependents .06 .46 .04 .42
(.35) (.93) (.32) (.96)
Wage 45095 56924 48492 47708
(29554) (41889) (31668) (35274)
Job Type: Academic .66 .42 .85 .50
(.47) (.49) (.35) (.50)
Job Type: Admin .15 .38 .05 .23
(.36) (.48) (.22) (.42)
Job Type: Union .12 .11 .06 .15
(.32) (.32) (.24) (.36)
N 2075 1584 787 187
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Table 2.25: Linear probability model of insurance take
up: all employees.
All Employees
Marg. Robust Std. Err.
Age .00*** (.00)
Female .07*** (.01)
Dependents
1 .06*** (.01)
2 .13*** (.01)
3 .07*** (.01)
4+ –.01 (.01)
Female*Dependents
1 –.10*** (.02)
2 –.06*** (.01)
3 –.06*** (.01)
4+ –.03 (.01)
Ln(Salary) .04*** (.00)
New –.19*** (.01)
Academic –.02** (.01)
Temporary Employee –.08*** (.01)
Peer Effect Aetna Wellness –.02 (.02)
Peer Effect Aetna –.05* (.02)
Peer Effect Third .00 (.01)
Medical Utilization Intensity .05*** (.00)
Const .09* (.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes
mean .80
N 47603
r2 .35
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level.
** Significant at 1 percent level.
* Significant at 5 percent level.
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CHAPTER 3
MEDICAL EXPENDITURES UNDER A WELLNESS PLAN
3.1 Introduction
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has identified four behaviors - inactivity,
poor nutrition, tobacco use, and frequent alcohol consumption - as the primary causes of chronic
disease in US (Mattke et al. 2013). These behaviors result in increased prevalence of diabetes, heart
disease, and chronic pulmonary conditions, and lead to a decreased quality of life, premature death,
and disability. While these diseases were once associated with old age, the early onset of these
diseases mean that a large portion of the health cost of these diseases is born by employers, through
absence from work, reduced performance, and increased health insurance costs. According to a
report released by the Milken Institute the cumulative health care costs associated with chronic
disease totaled around $277 billion (Mattke et al. 2013).
According to the 2013 Rand Survey of Employers, more than 50% of US employers offer work-
place wellness programs to employees. A workplace wellness program can include on-site gym or
discounts on gym membership, an on-site nutrition and health counseling as well as health checks
or a partnership with local physicians to increase use of preventive care services. Some wellness
programs include group programs with incentives toward weight loss, smoking cessation, stress
management, or other measures of healthy living. While some of these programs are offered in-
dependently, over 30% of employers tie wellness programs with health insurance benefits. These
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programs have many aims. For employees, the program is intended to provide resources and em-
phasize healthy living. Many such programs aim directly to identify and treat early risks to health.
If a chronic health condition is present, such as diabetes or high blood pressure, the program is
intended to facilitate regular checks and maintenance of the conditions to reduce the incidence of
complications. The benefit to employers is two-fold. The wellness programs aim to improve the
maintenance of chronic conditions, reducing the lost productivity from abstenseeism and presen-
teeism. The wellness program also allows the employer to direct the medical care received by the
employee and family, to some extent. As the New York Times article described, employers are
using wellness programs to slow the growth of costs associated with health insurance in advance
of the excise tax imposed by the Affordable Care Act in 2018 (Abelson, 2013). In Chapter 1 of
this dissertation, I discuss the simple economics of wellness programs.
The savings in health insurance costs would stem from both a change in a pattern of utilization as
well as the improvements in health. Many of the wellness programs, particularly those integrated
with a health insurance plan encourage or require the completion of a risk assessment questionnaire
as well as a health check with a primary care physician. The primary care physician is intended to
identify health risks and develop a set of goals for the member to follow during the year to reduce
the risks. This also offers the primary care physician an opportunity to increase the outpatient care
for existing medical conditions, reducing the incidence of emergency room use and hospitaliza-
tion. Combined, members should see a decrease in more expensive emergency room and inpatient
hospital use, and an increase in outpatient and ambulatory care.
This paper evaluates the health services utilization by members of a wellness plan integrated into
health insurance. I first look at the combined impact of changes in patterns of utilization and
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improved health. Based on medical claims files, I analyze the effect of wellness plan enrollment
on total medical expenditure. Next, I focus specifically on the patterns of utilization by repeating
the analysis of medical expenditure by type of care, separating inpatient and outpatient, as well
as emergency and preventive care. To analyze the change in the pattern of utilization, I look at
utilization in terms of visits. In this context, I can furthermore differentiate by type of preventive
visits, such as nutritional counseling, smoking-cessation, as well as mammogram.
A major contribution of this analysis is the length of the panel, which allows results to extend to
the longer term effects of wellness programs. To study the changing effect of wellness programs
on medical expenditure, I start the analysis by conducting an event study. The event study com-
pares the medical expenditure of those who eventually enroll in the wellness program, to those
who never enroll, in the years leading to the enrollment and in the years that follow. The event
study, therefore, shows how the utilization of the wellness program evolves over time. This is an
important component of the development of the wellness program, as the preventive care utiliza-
tion should have an immediate effect on the medical expenditure, but the overall gains in health are
likely to show only after years of preventive care.
The event study is followed by a descriptive multivariate analysis of how medical utilization
differs for those enrolled in the health insurance with wellness program. To account for possible
selection bias on observables, I extend the analysis and use propensity score matching. In the
conclusion I discuss the challenges of extending the analysis further to address selection into the
wellness program on unobservables.
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The data used in the analysis comes from a large self-insured university employer. The employer
introduced a wellness program in 2008 integrated with a health insurance plan, Aetna Wellness,
in parallel to an already existing identical plan Aetna. Aetna Wellness provided substantial finan-
cial incentive for enrollment, with a lower deductible and a lower premium. It provided a set of
features aimed to improve healthy living, and required only the completion of a risk assessment
questionnaire. Despite the substantial incentives to enroll in Aetna Wellness, many employees in-
stead enrolled in the Aetna plan which lacked the wellness features. Chapter 2 of this dissertation
reports empirical analyses that explore in detail possible explanations for this puzzle. In the next
section, I discuss the features of the Aetna Wellness plan, as well as some of the factors in choosing
Aetna Wellness, contributing towards the challenges to estimation of effect of wellness features on
medical utilization.
The analysis conducted here finds that those who switch into Aetna Wellness do change the com-
position of medical services they use. Aetna Wellness members use 0.5 more preventive visits
compared to the average 2.05 visits by non-members. They also use more outpatient services. The
increases in utilization are not well matched by declines in other areas. The intensity of emergency
room utilization does not change significantly, but Aetna Wellness members are 3 percentage points
less likely to use the emergency room during the year. The use of inpatient acute hospitalizations
also decline by 0.06 visits on an average of 0.37 visits per year for non-members.
In terms of the expenditure, however, these changes in medical utilization do not translate into sig-
nificant savings. The overall medical expenditure per wellness plan participant per year increases
by an average between $50 to $198 per year. Inpatient acute care expenditure declines by $453
on an average of $1580 per year, while emergency room expenditure declines by a modest $19 on
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an average of $480. However, pharmacy expenditure increases by $212, and all other care, which
includes outpatient expenditure increases by $224.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: Section 2 will present Aetna Wellness and
discuss the features of the plan. It will also describe the uptake of the plan by employees and in
doing so, it will refer to Chapter 2 about the sources of selection into the plan. Section 3 will
review the literature in wellness plan evaluation, while Section 4 will discuss the challenges to
estimation. Section 5 will discuss the data and present some summary statistics. Section 6 will
discuss the estimation strategy. Section 7 presents the estimation results. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Aetna Wellness
In 2008, in cooperation with the local area physicians, the employer introduced Aetna Wellness to
the health insurance menu on offer to its employees. Aetna Wellness was derived from and offered
simultaneously with the Aetna PPO plan. The aim of the Aetna Wellness plan was to include
the primary physician more actively in the preventive health care for the member, to identify and
treat health risks before they evolve into costly hospitalizations. The plan was also designed to
encourage healthier lifestyle by offering discounts to the gym, counseling for obesity, smoking
cessation, and stress management. To achieve these goals, the enrollees were required to choose a
primary care physician (PCP) and complete a health risk assessment questionnaire. On the basis
of the questionnaire, the PCP would conduct an annual physical examination. Beyond the initial
examination, the PCP did not act as a gatekeeper for the health plan as the member could use any
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specialist services without referrals.
The employer designed the financial characteristics of Aetna Wellness to be comparable with
and more appealing than existing plans. Table 1 presents a side-by-side comparison of all health
insurance choices for a family in 2012. Compared to the Aetna plan, Aetna Wellness had the
same coinsurance rate, the same network of physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies, and no refer-
rals were necessary for specialist visits. Aetna Wellness was better than Aetna because it had a
lower premium, deductible, and annual out of pocket maximum across the years, and it offered
health services such as discounted gym membership. However, upon enrollment in Aetna Well-
ness, the employee was required to select a primary care physician (PCP), and complete a health
risk assessment questionnaire. These features constitute the additional non-monetary cost of Aetna
Wellness.
The brochure that introduced of Aetna Wellness, as well as subsequent issues, specifies that the
employee would be responsible only for selecting a PCP and completing a health risk assess-
ment. The brochure also urged employees to also encourage dependents to engage in same healthy
lifestyle. The brochure does not specify any penalties for failure to complete the health risk as-
sessment questionnaire or having an annual physical. Thus, if the employee chooses to sign up for
Aetna Wellness exclusively for plan savings, without completion of any of the requirements, there
are no financial or other penalties imposed.
The aim of the Aetna Wellness plan was to include the primary physician more actively in the
preventive health care for the member, to identify and treat health risks before they evolve into
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costly hospitalizations. The plan was also designed to encourage healthier lifestyle by offering dis-
counts to the gym, counseling for obesity, smoking cessation, and stress management. To achieve
these goals, the enrollees were required to choose a primary care physician (PCP) and complete a
health risk assessment questionnaire. On the basis of the questionnaire, the PCP would conduct an
annual physical examination. Beyond the initial examination, the PCP did not act as a gatekeeper
for the health plan as the member could use any specialist services without referrals. The assess-
ment questionnaire and the visit with the primary care physician incurred no copay or coinsurance.
Similarly, the counseling sessions were offered at a copay of $10 to $20.
While Aetna plan offers the closest comparison to Aetna Wellness in terms of choice and uti-
lization, the analysis will include individuals who switched into Aetna Wellness from both Aetna
and the Third Plan. Table 1 presents a side-by-side comparison of plans available to employees
between 2008 and 2012. For an employee with a family in 2012, there were 5 plans to choose from
starting in 2008. Of these plans, the first three had the overwhelmingly largest enrollment among
active employees. In this analysis, I disregard employees enrolled in Aetna 80/20 and the Aetna
Health Savings Account (HSA). The Aetna 80/20 was a plan designed and used overwhelmingly
be retired employees. It offers a higher coinsurance rate of 20%. It is not a suitable comparison
to the Aetna Wellness program because of both substantial difference in the type of population, as
well as the difference in the structure of benefits. Similarly, the Aetna HSA account does not offer
a good comparison of benefit structure. Furthermore, the enrollment in the HSA account did not
exceed 30 employees per year.
Looking across the columns of Table 1, Aetna Wellness is sufficiently similar to Aetna and the
Third plan to allow for a reasonable comparison. All three plans have the same in-network coinsur-
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ance rate, and only the Third plan differs on the out of network coinsurance rate. To circumvent the
difference in the in-network and out-of-network rates, I will use the insurance allowed amounts for
medical services as the basis of comparison. All the plans have the same co-pay for office visits,
making them comparable across plans. Furthermore, the Third plan differs from Aetna Wellness
in the network of physicians and hospitals. However, a comparison of in-network physicians in the
primary zip code of the employer from the insurer website showed a similar number of providers.
Given the geographically concentrated locality of the employer, this suggests that the networks
overlap substantially.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation studies two factors in the choice of Aetna Wellness. In particular, the
paper addresses the puzzle of low enrollment in the presence of financial incentives of up to $1500,
through the effect of peer choices and family health. The results show that peer enrollment in Aetna
Wellness increases own probability of enrollment. However, family health has an ambiguous effect
on choice of Aetna Wellness. When using a metric of severe, often chronic, medical conditions,
the employee is moderately less likely to enroll in Aetna Wellness. However, when measuring
health in terms of intensity of medical services utilization, there is evidence of modest increase in
probability of enrollment.
These results suggest that selection may be present in the choice of Aetna Wellness. The early
joiners into Aetna Wellness may be predisposed towards wellness activities and preventive care,
biasing the effect on preventive care upwards. As Aetna Wellness becomes more prevalent, the
later joiners may be responding more to the difference in prices, and therefore preferences over
wellness are likely to generate less selection and less bias. The comparison of utilization between
Aetna Wellness and those who never enrolled in the plan will have to account for the selection
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occurring in plan selection. The estimation method used in this chapter, though controlling for the
selection on observables, will not control for the selection on unobservable characteristics, which
is left as an extension to present work.
The next section will discuss the program evaluation literature for wellness plans. It will then shift
focus towards propensity score matching literature which will be the preferred estimation method
for this analysis.
3.3 Literature Review
Wellness programs have been evaluated across many dimensions. Osilla et al (2012) conduct a sys-
tematic review of evaluations of worksite wellness programs. The evaluations reviewed by them
include different outcomes: exercise, diet, physiological markers, smoking, alcohol use, absen-
teeism, mental health, and healthcare costs. Healthcare costs were studied generally either through
randomized control trial (Milani and Lavie 2009), nonrandom comparison group (Henke et al.
2011, Merrill et al. 2011, Naydeck et al. 2008), or descriptive studies (Aldana et al. 2005,Stave
et al. 2003, Yen et al. 2010). All of these studies differed on the type of wellness program, the
duration of the observation period, as well as methodology, however they all looked at the effect
on total medical expenditure without any investigation into compositional changes.
One of the studies found no difference in total medical costs between the treated and control
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groups (Aldana et al. 2005). The other studies found cost savings ranging from $176 (Naydeck
et al. 2008) to $613 (Stave et al. 2003), and the randomized control trial found a decline of 48%
in annual claim costs (Milani and Lavie 2009). I will review the non-random comparison studies
and the randomized control trial in greater detail; the descriptive studies are not comparable in
methodology to the one used in this chapter.
Henke et al. (2011) use propensity score matching to evaluate the effect of Johnson & Johnson’s
health and wellness program on employee health risks and medical costs. The treatment group
was defined as employees who completed a risk assessment questionnaire. As a control group,
Johnson & Johnson anonymously selected comparison companies which it deemed similar in in-
dustry (manufacturing) and size (large, self-insured). Four of the 16 comparison companies had
fully operation wellness programs, while a sizable proportion did not have any current wellness
programs. All companies contributed at least two years of medical claims data. Medical care
costs were calculated as a total of all payments (inpatient, outpatient, and pharmaceutical), includ-
ing both employer and employee share of the costs. The followed a coarsened exact matching
approach in estimation, matching parsimoniously on basic demographic variables. Their results
suggest that Johnson & Johnson had 3.7% lower average annual growth in medical costs compared
to the comparison group, and an annual savings in medical costs of about $535 per employee.
Naydeck et al. (2008) conduct a similar study for Highmark Inc. employees. The sample consists
employees who chose to participate in the wellness program offered by the employer and who had
the biometric screening done. The control group consisted of Highmark employees who did not
participate in the wellness program and selected client accounts in similar industries as Highmark.
The method of comparison is matching on gender, age, net payments for healthcare expenditures,
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and comorbidities, with a sample of 1890 participants. They find $176 per person lower medical
expenses for participants, and $182 per person per year savings in inpatient expenses.
Milani and Lavie (2009) present the results of a randomized control trial (RCT) where participants
were recruited from two geographically disparate work sites of an employer. One site acted as the
treatment group, while the other was the control. Health risk evaluations were obtained at baseline
and 6 months after intervention for all participants. Of 339 participants, 185 were in the treatment
group. Though the treatment and control groups were randomly assigned, the control group was
older with a slightly larger share of smokers. Medical expenditure was taken from health insurance
files for 12 months prior to intervention and 12 months after the intervention. The results suggested
that while medical expenditure declined for both groups, for those in the treatment group it declined
by $941 more than the control group. The authors do not provide any other measure of medical
utilization.
The present study improves on the abovementioned studies in both methodology and data. The
randomized trial presents the gold standard in policy evaluation. Randomized trials, however, are
limited in the size and scope of the experiment, which is apparent in both the sample size and the
duration of the after-period in Milani and Lavie (2012). While the methodology of the present
study will be similar to Henke et al. (2011) and Naydeck et al. (2008), it will improve on these
studies in two important ways. First, when applying the propensity matching mechanism, manual
balancing will be applied to provide evidence on the quality of the match. Second, the analysis
will be conducted on multiple measures of utilization in addition to overall medical expenditure,
providing a fuller picture of the compositional changes in utilization. The next section discusses
the estimation method used in this study.
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3.4 Methods
In an ideal experimental set-up, employees would be assigned randomly to the Aetna Wellness
plan. Since the assignment would be random, the sample of employees in Aetna Wellness would
be comparable to employees not in the wellness plan. The observed utilization, therefore, would
reflect the effect of the Wellness plan. Let Yi1 represent the utilization when employee i is enrolled
in the Wellness plan (treatment), and let Yi0 be the utilization of individual i in the other plans
(control). Only one of the outcomes can be observed for individual i, and we must appeal to
randomized assignment to estimate the average effect of the treatment. Randomization provides us
with the assumption that
Yi1,Yi0 ⊥ Ti
conditional independence, which allows us to estimate the average effect treatment as:
τ = E(Yi1|Ti = 1) − E(Yi0|Ti = 0) = E(Yi|Ti = 1) − E(Yi|Ti = 0)
where Ti is the treatment status. That is, if the treatment is randomly assigned, then the difference
in the observed outcome between the treatment and control groups is a consistent estimate of the
treatment effect.
In an observational data, such as the one used here, the treatment and control groups are not
randomly assigned. The failure of the conditional independence assumption precludes a simple
comparison of outcomes. The treatment effect on the treated becomes:
τ|T=1 = E(Yi1|Ti = 1) − E(Yi0|Ti = 1)
That is, in the absence of random assignment, the treatment effect is the difference between the
observed treatment outcome, and the counterfactual outcome for the same group had they not
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received treatment. Since the counterfactual cannot be observed, however, Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) propose that conditional on observables for individual i, Xi, there should not be a systematic
pre-treatment difference between the groups assigned to treatment and control. However, as the
number of covariates in Xi increases, the dimension of comparison increases as well. Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) propose the propensity score as the means by which to match the treatment
with a control group. Let p(Xi) be the probability of individual i enrolling in treatment, defined as
p(Xi) = Pr(Ti = 1|Xi) = E(Ti|Xi), and 0 < p(Xi) < 1. If {(Yi1,Yi0) ⊥ Ti}|Xi, then the treatment
effect can be defined as:
τ|T=1 = E{E(Yi|Ti = 1, p(Xi)) − E(Yi|Ti = 0, p(Xi))|Ti = 1}
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of p(Xi)|Ti = 1. That is, conditional on the
propensity score as function of observable characteristics, the treatment effect is the difference
in observed outcomes between the treated and control. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) addresses
the choice of covariates Xi in the estimation of the propensity score, and propose a stratification
method adding higher order terms and interactions until there is no significant difference between
the two groups.
Non-experimental program evaluations came under scrutiny in LaLonde (1986). He estimated
the impact of a labor training program on post-intervention income levels. He used data from a
randomized evaluation of the program, and examined to the extent which non-experimental estima-
tors could replicated the treatment impact from the experimental estimate. Comparing regression,
fixed-effect, and latent variable selection models, LaLonde concluded that these estimators are
either inaccurate with respect to the experimental results, or are sensitive to specification used.
To counter the LaLonde critique, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) used the same data to estimate the
treatment effect using propensity score matching. They found that when the range of estimated
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propensity scores of the treatment and control groups overlap, the propensity score methods can
estimate the treatment impact for the treatment group, and are not sensitive to specification.
As Dehejia and Wahba (1999) emphasize, the key to success in matching is the successful overlap
in the propensity score between the treatment and control groups. This study will follow the
methodology laid out in Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming) for balancing and stratification of the
control group to improve the matching on the propensity score.
Before proceeding with the model and estimation, however, it is important to address the timing
component of enrollment in these programs. While Aetna Wellness was introduced in 2008, in
every year since employees have faced the choice of enrolling or not enrolling. Thus, contrary
to programs which have a single enrollment opportunity, there is no clear set up of treatment and
control. Figure 1 depicts the timing of the enrollment for the sample. Thus, in 2008, of the total
sample N, N08 are the treatment. In the analysis that follows, the control group will be defined in
two ways. First I compare those who switched at any time during the panel, N08 +N09 +N10 +N11 +
N12 +N13, to those who never switched. This analysis, therefore, will not differentiate between pre-
and post-switching behavior of those who switched into Aetna Wellness. It will serve to compare
the utilization of ever switchers to non-switchers, identifying the difference in utilization patterns
between the two groups. If the selection into treatment is biased, therefore, these estimates are
likely to reflect the greatest share of that bias. I label this comparison of ever-switchers to never-
switchers.
Then, I repeat the analysis comparing those who switched after the switch to the control group
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consisting of those who never switched and the switchers prior to switching. This comparison will
be closer to the experimental setting: it will compare employees enrolled in Aetna Wellness to
employees not enrolled in Aetna Wellness, and compare the changes in utilization. Because the
control group will consist of both never-switchers as well as switchers prior to switching, when
matched, a switcher may act as its own control group in the propensity score matching analysis.
This type of comparison should alleviate some of the bias due to nonrandom selection. I label
this comparison Aetna Wellness members to non-members. The analysis will focus on medical
expenditure by type, as well as utilization as defined by types of visits.
One of the main criticisms of propensity matching is that it matches on the basis of observable
characteristics only. Indeed the central assumption of the propensity matching technique is that
controlling for observed characteristics, the assignment to treatment and control are random. Fu-
ture extensions to this project will address the selection on unobservables.
3.5 Data
The data consists of health insurance plan selection and claims data from a large self-insured
university, spanning the period of 2007 to 2013. The sample consists of the universe of eligible
employees for that employer, which includes both hourly and salaried, administrative and faculty,
and other types of employees. From the sample I drop employees with missing department, as well
as non-active employees – this includes employees who are retired, on leave, on suspension, or on
other form of paid or unpaid leave. The remaining sample consists of 13,080 employees tracked
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over an average 4.2 years. Focusing only on employees who are members only of Aetna Wellness,
Aetna, or Third Plan, the sample is further reduced to 5,852 employees, to a total of 33,729 person
years. The analysis focuses on employees and their dependents, and therefore, while the unit
of analysis is the employee, all figures include or are adjusted for number of dependents. The
employees are tracked for an average of 5.25 years. Among the employees in the sample, 2,277
switched into Aetna Wellness at some point during the span of the panel. The remaining 3,575
remain as the control group as non-switchers.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of those who switched into Aetna Wellness to those who
never switched. The statistics for the those who switched are the average for both before and after
switching. The statistics suggest that switchers and non-switchers are overall different. Switchers
tend to have more dependents and earn somewhat less then non-switchers. Utilization is different
among the two groups as well. Overall, switchers appear to use medical services more inten-
sively, and have a higher total expenditure. However, while their inpatient expenses are lower, the
pharmaceutical expenditure is substantially higher.
Table 3 compares the medical expenditure of switchers before and after switching. The simple
comparison of statistics suggest that those who switch into Aetna Wellness tend to use medical ser-
vices more intensely after switching. This is also reflected in the medical expenditure. Emergency
room expenditure declines after switching, but inpatient expenditure increases slightly. Pharmacy
expenditure does not change significantly.
An important covariate in the estimation is past family health. I use two metrics of family health
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in this study, by making use of the claims data. The first, the Charlson Comorbidity Index, is an in-
dex which predicts the 10 year mortality of a patient who may have a range of comorbid conditions
from a total of 22. Each condition is assigned a score 1, 2, 3 or 6 depending on the risk of dying as-
sociated with each one. For example, a score of 1 is assigned to myocardial infarction, congestive
heart failure, peripheral vascular disease, dementia, cerebrovascular disease, chronic lung disease,
connective tissue disease, ulcer, chronic liver disease. A score of 2 is assigned to hemiplegia, mod-
erate or severe kidney disease, diabetes, diabetes with complication, tumor, leukemia, lymphoma.
The maximum score is 16, and a higher score is associated with greater mortality. The score is
assigned on the basis of medical claims. The family health index is the sum of the Charlson index
for the employee and dependents. In this sample 79% of families have a Charlson score of 0. Since
the index is heavily skewed, it reflects the presence of severe medical conditions in the expenditure
and utilization decision of the household. To capture the middle of the health distribution, I use
software developed at the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health.
The Johns Hopkins ACG R© software uses diagnostic codes from claims and case-mix methodol-
ogy to describe and predict population past or future health care utilization and costs. The Ad-
justed Clinical Groups (ACG) are a series of mutually exclusive health status categories defined
by morbidity, age, and sex. They are based on the premise that the level of resources necessary
for delivering appropriate healthcare to a population is correlated with the illness burden of that
population. Thus, individual diseases or conditions are placed into diagnostic groups based on five
clinical dimensions: duration of condition, severity of condition, diagnostic certainty, etiology of
the condition (infectious, injury, other), and specialty care involvement. The software allows me
to generate medical utilization intensity index which categorizes the individual according to health
services utilization:
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• 0 - No diagnoses available
• 1 - Healthy Users
• 2 - Low Users
• 3 - Moderate Users
• 4 - High Users
• 5 - Very High Users
For the family, the individual medical utilization intensity indices are summed. In the result, only
25% of the employees have a family score of 0, and the scores are well distributed in the healthy
to low user range. In the analysis that follows, both metrics will be used in estimation.
3.6 Estimation Strategy
Before proceeding with the propensity score matching, I estimate a naive specification:
Yit = α + β1Ti + β2Healthit−1 + γXit + 1,it (3.1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest for individual i in year t, Ti is an indicator of whether the
individual has ever joined Aetna Wellness, Healthit−1 is a measure of individual’s health in the
previous period, and Xit is a vector of individual characteristics. Here, β1 is the coefficient of
interest, estimating the difference in outcome variable between the ever joiners and never joiners
of Aetna Wellness.
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Next, I conduct an event study to see the change in medical expenditure for Aetna Wellness
members compared to non-joiners over time. To do so, I estimate:
Yit = α +
Tmax∑
j=Tmin
β1 jTi · Timei j + β2Healthit−1 + γXit + 2,it (3.2)
Here, Ti is the indicator for ever-joiner, and Timei j is a dummy variable for each year of data
before and after joining. The timing of this variable is important, as it tracks the years before
and after joining for each individual: Tmin corresponds to the largest number of panel years prior
to switching, and Tmax is the largest number of years after switching. The resulting vector of β1
estimates the difference in outcome variable between the ever joiners and never joiners in each year
prior and post joining.
If the wellness program indeed changes the composition of medical care utilization, one might
expect the effect to become more pronounced over time. While in the initial year of enrollment,
the member is likely to take advantage of the preventive and wellness features, over years, as the
member becomes better acquainted with the features, their utilization should increase. At the same
time, if the preventive care does reduce emergency and inpatient care, the decline should become
greater over time as the health gains materialize. Therefore, the event study should show an initial
decline in emergency and inpatient care, followed by a continued but steady decline over years of
enrollment in Aetna Wellness.
To evaluate the distributional effects of medical expenditure, I will estimate a two part conditional
model. In the first part, I will estimate a binary specification of any medical expenditure:
Pr(Mit) = f (Healthit−1, Xit, 3,it) (3.3)
where Mit is an indicator variable for any medical expenditure, and Healthit−1 and Xit are health
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and a vector of individual characteristics, as before. In the second part, I re-estimate the linear
specification in equation (1) conditional on non-zero medical expenditure. The two-part model is
used frequently in health economics to account for the share of zero medical expenditures. Jones
(2000) in the Handbook of Health Economics reviews the justification for using a two-part model
(2PM) compared to a generalized Tobit or a sample selection specification (SSM). The two-part
model was adopted for the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse et al. 1980, Leibowitz
et al. 1985, Manning, Newhouse et al. 1987) because of the unreliable statistical performance of
the SSM. While the debate between the two methods continues, Duan et al. (1984) showed that in
some contexts, the multi-part and sample selection models give similar results.
Angrist and Pischke (2009) compare Tobit specification to the two-part model. They note that the
Tobit model does not fit the features of the health expenditure specification since it was designed
for data with censored observations, and while health expenditure assumes only positive values and
has a mass point at zero, it is a not censored limited dependent variable. Instead, health insurance
data can be subject to two separate processes determining the zero and non-zero values. Comparing
the marginal effect estimates of the Tobit and two-part models, they find similar estimates for the
effect of childbearing on mothers’ labor supply. With this, they conclude that while the non-linear
models may provide a better fit, when it comes to the marginal effect, however, the linear model is
sufficiently close.
In all of these specifications, however, the coefficient estimates may be biased by potential for
selection occurring when the employee chooses Aetna Wellness. For example, the switchers may
be healthier employees who are more likely to take advantage of gym discounts, and biasing the
effect of Aetna Wellness on medical expenditure downward. On the other hand, Aetna Wellness
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may attract more health conscious employees, who are more active in preventive care, resulting in a
positive bias on medical expenditure. Since the enrollment in the plan is not randomly assigned, the
conditional independence assumption (CIA), Yi1,Yi0 ⊥ Ti, necessary for a causal interpretation of
the coefficient may not hold. Here, CIA fails because the Aetna Wellness employees are compared
to a pool of employees who are systematically different from them.
To generate a quasi-experimental setting for the estimation, I use propensity score matching to
trim the control group. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), I will estimate the treatment
effect using
τ|T=1 = E{E(Yi|Ti = 1, p(Xi)) − E(Yi|Ti = 0, p(Xi))|Ti = 1} (3.4)
where p(Xi) is the propensity score, and Ti is the treatment status. The propensity score matching
will yield unbiased estimated if two conditions are satisfied. The first, the conditional independence
assumption, is now conditional on the vector of covariates: {(Yi1,Yi0) ⊥ Ti}|Xi. And second, the
propensity score of the treated and control must overlap: 0 < p(Xi) < 1.
The estimation is a two step process. In the first step, the propensity score is estimated using a
logit specification:
Pr(Tit) = f (Healthit−1, Xit, t, 4,it) (3.5)
where Tit is a treatment selection indicator, Xit is a vector of covariates, t are year fixed effects,
and 4,it is individual specific error.
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In the second step, observations from the treated group are matched to observations from the
control group. The matching is performed with the nearest neighbor method, where the treated
observations are matched to control observations according to the absolute value of the difference
in the propensity score. The outcome variables, Yi1 and Yi0 are compared using these matched
samples to generate the estimate of the treatment effect.
As an initial estimate, I use the Stata R© tse f f ects command. It uses a logit specification to esti-
mate the propensity score for selection into treatment. Then, observations are matched by nearest
neighbor matching on the basis of the propensity score. The logit specification, however, does
not guarantee that the conditional independence assumption is satisfied. To explore this further, I
re-estimate the model using the method described by Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming) which dif-
fers from the Stata in the more thorough balancing and stratification methods used to estimate the
propensity score. In addition to a iterative selection of the covariates, Imbens and Rubin suggest
a careful assessment of the balancing of data. To that effect, they recommend gradual splitting
of comparison groups by blocks of propensity score to ensure that the treated and control groups
in each block are balanced in covariates. This balancing and stratification process ensures that
the observations are matched not only on the propensity score, but that the underlying covariates
are also comparable. Once the propensity score is estimated using the balancing and stratification
method, the matching will use the same nearest neighbor method to estimate the average treatment
effect.
In the next section, I first discus the results of the baseline estimation. Then, I proceed to present
the results of the two stage estimates of effect of switching conditional on any expenditure. Fi-
nally, I introduce the propensity matching results. The section will be divided according to the
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comparison group used.
3.7 Results
The outcome variables of interest focus both on expenditure and on utilization. The data provides
several categories by type of medical expenditure: total, emergency, pharmacy, and inpatient acute.
I define the category of other expenditure as the difference between the total and the other cate-
gories. All expenditure variables are defined as allowed amounts; these correspond to the insurance
negotiated price for procedure, and include both the patient and insurance share of the cost.
Utilization is also analyzed as visits by category on both the intensive as well as extensive margin:
emergency, preventive, inpatient, outpatient, smoking cessation counseling, alcohol counseling,
nutrition counseling, and mammogram. To generate the visits information, I parsed through claims
data to catalog them by type. To define the emergency, inpatient, and outpatient visits, I used the
place of service as the indicator of visit type. Thus, the place of service for emergency visit is a
hospital emergency room, while for inpatient it is an inpatient hospital. An outpatient visit can
take place in a number of locations, including outpatient hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or
doctor’s office.
To define the preventive service category, I relied on an Aetna Benefit Guidance Statement, which
listed all ICD-9 diagnostic codes which are covered as preventive. Aside from wellness exams,
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these include developmental testing; screening for depression, hearing, vision, cancer, osteoporo-
sis, anemia, sexually transmitted diseases, cholesterol, diabetes, sickle cell, hepatitis B and C, HIV,
and many others; immunizations; electrocardiograms; obesity preventive counseling; healthy diet
counseling; alcohol/drug counseling; tobacco counseling; sexually transmitted infections counsel-
ing; and genetic counseling. Using the categories provided by the diagnostic codes, I define the
types of preventive visits.
The results will be presented according to the definition of the comparison groups. The first
section will contain the results from the analysis comparing ever switchers to never switchers.
The analysis will then be repeated in the following section for Aetna Wellness members to non-
members.
3.7.1 Ever-switchers vs. never-switchers
Table 4 consists of estimation of specifications (1) and (2). The first column presents the results for
the linear specification using the lagged Charlson Index to control for health. The second column
repeats the linear specification but controls for health using lagged medical utilization intensity.
The dependent variable is total allowed medical expenditure in dollars. The coefficient of interest
is an indicator variable denoting membership in Aetna Wellness, and columns 1 and 2 show that
controlling for covariates, those who switch to Aetna Wellness spend on average $4 to $466 more
in total than those who never switch, though the results are not statistically significantly different
from zero at conventional levels.
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The third column presents the coefficient estimates specification (2). The event study presented
in that column compares switchers and never-switchers in the years leading up to, and following,
switching. The estimates of this specification are plotted in Figure 2 with the 95% interval for four
expenditure categories: total, emergency, pharmacy, and inpatient acute. Each of the coefficients
in the third column represent the difference in dollars of total medical expenditure between never
switchers and switchers in the years leading up to, and following, switching. Thus, for employees
who switched, six years prior to switching they spent $394 more than never switchers. By the time
the employees switched, they were still spending $981 more than never switchers. Thus, because
the panel consists of 7 years, this affords a 6 year look back, and a 5 year forward look. The year
zero corresponds to the year the employee switched to Aetna Wellness, which differs for every
employee.
Figure 2 represents the analysis graphically. The horizontal axis corresponds to the years before
and years after switching, spanning from 6 years prior to 5 years forward. The vertical axis plots
the coefficient values from the regression estimates, which are in effect the average difference in
expenditure between switchers and non-switchers. The bars provide the 95% confidence interval.
Each panel depicts a different category of expenditure. While the large standard errors do not
make these estimates reliable, there is a trend apparent in emergency and pharmacy expenditure.
In both categories, expenditure appears to decline around the switching time. Though, pharmacy
expenditures seem to trend lower in the years before switching.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 depict the results of the baseline estimates for expenditure and utilization
categories. All of these tables are split into two panels. The top panel has the estimates of the
baseline specification using the Charlson Index to control for past family health. The bottom panel
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has the estimates using the medical utilization intensity metric for family health. All estimates
that follow control for family demographics and year fixed effects. All reported standard errors are
clustered at individual level.
The first column of Table 5 repeats the estimates of the first and second columns of Table 4. The
estimates suggest that those who switch to Aetna Wellness spend on average $4 to $466 more in
total. When breaking this down into categories, however, an interesting pattern emerges. Those
who switch spend between $328 to $426 more on prescriptions in column 3, but about $393 to
$505 less on acute care in column 4. The estimate on acute care is statistically significant and
robust across the two specifications, and represents a 24% difference between switchers and non-
switchers. Emergency room expenditure is not very different between the groups as seen by the
estimates in column 2.
Table 6 looks at utilization of medical services by type on the intensive margin. I defined the cat-
egory of utilization either using the place of service or insurance coding for the conditions. Thus,
emergency, inpatient, and outpatient visits were defined by the place of service. The preventive
visits were defined according to a comprehensive list of visits considered preventive by Aetna. Be-
cause of this specification, preventive and outpatient visits are not mutually exclusive. Across the
four categories, the statistically significant differences are in use of preventive services (column
2), and outpatient services (column 4). Switchers tend to have between .21 to .25 more preventive
visits per year, which corresponds to a 15% of the mean. Similarly, switchers have between 2.19
to 2.93 more outpatient visits compared to non-switchers, on a base of 16.8 visits a year. However,
the estimate on the emergency and inpatient visits are small and statistically insignificant. Com-
paring to the expenditure this suggests that those who switch to Aetna Wellness do not have fewer
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inpatient visits, but do incur less acute care costs during their visits. Given that these estimates
control for both age and past health, the duality suggests that Aetna Wellness is indeed shifting
more of the care to outpatient setting, resulting in less severe hospitalizations.
Do those who enroll in Aetna Wellness use the features provided by the program? Table 7 looks
specifically at certain types of visits, available to employees, but provided at a discounted copay
rate to Aetna Wellness employees. The dependent variable here is a dummy for whether the em-
ployee or dependent ever had these visits during the year. Switchers are 2 percentage points less
likely to visit the emergency room, though in the previous sections we saw no difference in the
expenditure or intensity of visits. They are also 3 to 4 percentage points more likely to have a
preventive visit. However, the preventive visits do not appear to take advantage of the features of
the wellness plan. Switchers are 2 to 3 percentage points less likely to have a smoking cessation,
alcohol counseling, or nutrition counseling visit compared to non-switchers. Switchers are also 5
to 7 percentage points more likely to take advantage of mammography services.
The two-part specification described by equation (3) is estimated in Table 8. In each of the four
expenditure categories, the first column presents the estimates from the first part of any expendi-
ture. The second part which estimates specification (1) conditional on non-zero expenditure. The
results of the second part are presented in the second column in each category. In total and phar-
macy expenditure, Aetna Wellness members are more likely to have positive expenditure. Condi-
tional on non-zero expenditure, however, Aetna Wellness members do not differ significantly from
non-members in level of expenditure. The notable expenditure is acute care expenditure, where
switchers spend on average $4388 less than never-switchers. The results are very similar when
using the medical utilization intensity to control for past health.
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Proceeding to propensity score matching, Table 9 presents the results from the baseline estimate
side-by-side with the matched estimates. Each of the numbers in this table, is the coefficient on
"Wellness Member" from a regression with a different dependent variable. The dependent variables
are listed in the left-most column. The first column repeats the baseline estimates from Tables 5, 6,
7. The second column has the estimates of the Stata matched comparison of treatment and control
groups.
The estimates change quantitatively, but qualitatively the effect is unchanged. The total medical
expenditure increases by $268 for those who switched, driven primarily by pharmacy expenses
which increased by $276, and other expenses (which includes outpatient care) $392. Inpatient care
declined by $484. The number of visits support the trend in expenditure. Switchers have .25 more
preventive visits compared to non-switchers, and about 2.89 more outpatient visits. They also tend
to have .08 fewer inpatient visits, and .02 fewer emergency visits. Looking at the extensive margin
of medical service use, the baseline results hold essentially unchanged. Switchers tend to use
preventive services and mammograms, but not the counseling such as smoking cessation, alcohol,
and nutrition counseling. Table 10 repeats the analysis using the medical utilization intensity as a
measure of health. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those in Table 9.
To evaluate the quality of the match generated by Stata, Figure 3 plots the density of the propensity
score according to treatment status. The solid line corresponds to the never-switchers, while the
dashed line represents the switchers. While the bulk of the distribution overlaps successfully, there
is substantial difference in the tails of both distributions. The non-switchers have a heavier left tail,
while the switchers have a heavier right tail. In the next step, the manual balancing will trim the
tails to make the distributions more comparable.
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Table 11 compares the mean and standard deviations of the treated and control groups after bal-
ancing for the covariates used in matching. The first four columns present the means and standard
deviations of covariates by treatment status. The fifth column shows the normalized difference
of the means. The sixth column, labeled as pi0.05 Control, represents the share of treated obser-
vations falling outside the 5% range of the control group. Similarly, the seventh column lists the
percentage of control observations falling outside the 5% range of the treated group. Inspecting the
balance of covariates, gender appears to be the least balanced. The normalized difference remains
substantial, though it is reasonable that the ranges overlap perfectly. The same can be concluded
about the faculty status of the employee, with a large normalized difference but perfectly overlap-
ping ranges. This is due to the binary nature of the variables. In other categories, however, the
normalized difference is small, and the overlap very good. Age has 7% of treated observations
falling outside the 95% sample of the control group, and wage has 2% of treated falling outside
that range.
Figure 4 presents the histograms of covariate distribution by treatment status. The teal colored
bars are the treated group, while the white bars are the control group. The histograms confirm the
balancing of covariates seen in Table 12. Among the four covariates in the first four panels, all
covariates overlap nicely between the treated and control groups. In the first plot, the age of the
treated appears to be a little less spread than for the control, however, the overall fit is excellent. The
last panel in the figure plots the linear propensity score distribution by treatment status. Here, we
see a marked shift between the treated and control. However, as Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming)
discuss, since the focus of the balancing exercise is to compare on the covariates, the propensity
score which is an amalgamation of these often reflects the complexity of the dimensionality of the
matching.
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The estimates from the manually balanced propensity score matching are in the third column of
Table 12. The first two columns in that table repeat the estimates in Table 10 for ease of compar-
ison. Qualitatively, the estimates from the balanced match paint the same picture. Switchers tend
to have lower expenditures in inpatient acute care (-$429), and emergency room care (-$14), but
higher expenditures in prescriptions ($265). They also have a greater number of preventive (.21)
and outpatient visits (2.24), and fewer number of inpatient visits (-.06). On the extensive margin,
however, Aetna Wellness members tend to be less likely to use the emergency room (3 percent-
age points), but more likely to have preventive visits (4 percentage points) including mammogram
(2 percentage points), without taking advantage of the wellness counseling such as smoking (-2
percentage points), alcohol (-2 percentage points), and nutrition (-2 percentage points).
3.7.2 Switchers: Before and After
Next, I change the comparison group to evaluate the before and after changes for those who
switched to Aetna Wellness. Table 13, 14, 15 present the estimates for utilization after enrollment
for Aetna Wellness members. The indicator variable "After Switching" becomes 1 for switchers
once they are enrolled in Aetna Wellness. It remains 0 for switchers before they are enrolled, as
well as never-switchers. In Table 13, Aetna Wellness members experienced between $95 and $107
decline in their emergency room expenditure after switching, but the expenditure in other category,
which includes outpatient visits, increased between $810 and $960. Total expenditure increased
between $464 to $760, however the estimate is too noisy and is not significant.
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Utilization is analyzed in Table 14, on the intensive margin. Compared to before, the change in
utilization has greater magnitude, as emergency visits decline by .13 visits on an average of .51
after switching. However preventive and outpatient visits increase significantly, with preventive
visits increasing by .21 on an average of 1.63, which is a more than 12% increase in the number
of visits. Table 15 estimates utilization on the extensive margin after enrollment. Aetna Wellness
members have a 8 to 11 percentage point decline in emergency room use, but a parallel 3 percentage
point increase in preventive care visits. The use of counseling services provided by Aetna Wellness
is, once again, weak, with a 4 to 6 percentage point decline in smoking cessation counseling, 3 to
6 percentage point decline in alcohol counseling, 2 to 5 percentage point decrease in nutrition
counseling, and a 3 to 5 percentage point increase in mammograms.
The two part estimation results are in Table 16, with the first column presenting the estimates for
probability of any expenditure, and the second column presenting the estimates of specification
(1) conditional on non-zero expenditure. Aetna Wellness members are 14 to 21 percentage point
more likely to have any expenditure and 4 to 6 percentage point more likely to have pharmacy
expenditure, though 7 percentage point less likely to have emergency expenditure. Conditional on
any expenditure, however, their utilization does not differ significantly from their prior utilization
and from non-switchers.
Table 18 includes the estimates from the baseline specification in the first column, as well as the
propensity score matching estimates in columns 2 and 3. The second column contains the estimates
from Stata matched comparison of treated and control. The third column presents the manually
balanced treated and control group comparison.
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Before interpreting the coefficients, however, Figure 5 plots the distribution of covariates after the
manual balancing. The balancing here has a lower quality, particularly in the wage, as the treated
group has a large concentration in the left tail. The linearized propensity score reflects the lower
quality of the match, with a substantial shift between the density of the treated and control groups.
As an extension to this analysis, a trimming procedure would help balance the covariates better to
improve the comparison.
The second and third columns of Table 18 paint a qualitatively similar picture. After enrollment,
Aetna Wellness members appear to have fewer emergency room expenditures, by $70 less, and a
$394 decline in inpatient acute expenditure. This estimate shows a modest rise in total medical
and a decline in pharmacy expenditure, though the large standard errors render these estimates not
statistically different from zero.
Utilization also changes for Aetna Wellness members. On the intensive margin then have .17
fewer emergency room visits, .12 fewer inpatient visits. On the other hand, they use .08 more
preventive visits, and 4.25 more outpatient visits. This is also reflected in the extensive margin,
as switchers are 9 percentage points less likely to use the emergency room use, and 2 percentage
points more likely to have preventive visits. And, as before, switchers are less likely to use the
features of the wellness program, with a 3 percentage points lower probability of using smoking
cessation counseling, 2 percentage points lower probability of using alcohol counseling, and 2
percentage points lower probability of using nutritional counseling.
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3.8 Discussion
3.8.1 Discussion of Results
The results suggest that Aetna Wellness member did not have a lower overall medical expenditure.
Comparing those who switched into Aetna Wellness anytime during the panel to those who never
switched, switchers have overall higher expenditure, buoyed by higher expenditure in outpatient
care. The composition of expenditure is different, as switchers tend to have lower emergency and
acute expenditure, but higher pharmacy expenditure. This pattern is also supported by evidence
in utilization. Switchers are both less likely to use the emergency room, and tend to have fewer
visits. They they are more intensive users of preventive care, both on the intensive and extensive
margin. Since the comparison made here is between switchers and never-switchers, this pattern of
utilization can be attributed to selection into Aetna Wellness: switchers tend to be more focused on
preventive care and are particularly attracted to the features of the wellness plan. However, looking
at the use of the counseling services offered with Aetna Wellness, the switchers are not users of
these services, though they make greater use of mammograms.
After joining Aetna Wellness, switchers do not significantly change their overall medical expendi-
ture, though the composition of their expenditure continues to be different. After switching, Aetna
Wellness members tend to spend less in the emergency room, resulting from both fewer emergency
room visits, and a smaller proportion of members going to the emergency room. Expenditure on
outpatient and preventive services increases, from both a greater number of visits and a greater
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share of members going for preventive visits. Despite the increase in the frequency of preventive
visits, however, Aetna Wellness members do not take advantage of the enhanced wellness features,
as they are less likely to attend the smoking, nutrition, and alcohol counseling session.
The different comparison groups suggest that the switchers may have increased the preventive
visits and healthier lifestyle before enrolling in Aetna Wellness. Figure 2 shows modest evidence
in a declining pre-trend, especially in pharmacy expenditures. This suggests that the perception of
wellness is an important component of the switching behavior.
The event study suggests that the effect lasts over time. While the large standard errors do not
allow statistical significance of results, the estimates suggest that emergency expenditure for Aetna
Wellness members declines sharply in the first year of enrollment, and remains low in the subse-
quent years. Pharmacy expenditure also declines upon switching, but the decline is less pronounced
over time. This time trend suggests that the wellness program has the intended effect on the pat-
tern of medical utilization. A more detailed analysis of the time component is warranted in future
studies, to see if the utilization pattern persists and whether the gains from reduced inpatient care
eventually outweigh the costs of additional preventive care.
While a result presented here show a slight increase in total medical expenditure, the literature
discussed in the previous sections shows total medical expenditure unchanged or declining. The
difference in results can be attributed to multiple factors. The results presented here are limited to
one employer in the education industry. The conclusions, therefore, are not readily generalizable to
other industries. Hanke et al. (2011) analyze utilization at Johnson & Johnson and other large self-
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insured employers in the manufacturing industry. Naydeck et al. (2008) use a sample of Highmark
Inc. employees, and compares participants to non-participants and clients in similar industries.
Another source of the difference could be the design of the wellness program. The wellness
program studied by Milani and Lavie (2009) not only offers the risk assessment and counseling,
but it also offers workplace medical care by nurses. In the results here, the decline in hospital and
emergency room is offset by increases in preventive care expenditure. If the workplace medical
care replaces the preventive care, it would not be reflected in the health insurance utilization files
and, therefore, underestimate the cost of preventive care.
Finally, the present analysis uses a longer period to evaluate the medical expenditure and uti-
lization resulting from a wellness plan. Milani and Lavie (2009), by design compare medical
expenditure 12 months prior and 12 months following the introduction of wellness plan. Henke et
al. (2011) track 2 years of medical utilization data, which incorporates both the pre- and the post-
period. Wellness programs may reduce utilization in the initial year, but utilization may return to
pre-wellness levels in the following years.
3.8.2 Limitations and Extensions
The propensity score matching relies on the matching of treated and control on the basis of observ-
able characteristics. If selection into treatment occurs based on the unobservables, the propensity
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score matching does not account for these differences. The selection on unobservables is a major
limitation of this matching method. To account for the unobservable heterogeneity in the data, I
intend to extend the analysis using the panel nature of the data. Smith and Todd (2005), building on
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), propose a difference-in-differences propensity match-
ing method to take advantage of the available pre- and post-treatment data. Smith and Todd (2005)
use the LaLonde (1986) and Dehejia and Wahba (1999) experimental labor training data to evalu-
ate the performance of various propensity score matching estimators. They find that difference-in-
differences performs best, which they attribute to the elimination of remaining unobservable bias.
To set up a difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimator, the treatment group will
have to be compared contemporaneously to the control group. That is, looking at Figure 1, for
example the 2010 treatment group will be N10, while the control group will be N −N08−N09−N10.
The process of manual balancing can be used with this specification.
The results of this study rely on the success of the propensity matching method. This presents the
another limitation of this study, as the bias of the estimate depends on the quality of the matching
mechanism. The similarity of the results across methods suggests that despite the manual balanc-
ing, the treatment and control groups remain substantially different. The next step in this direction
is to explore further trimming and matching techniques to identify how the estimates depend on
the method and specification.
Finally, the effectiveness of the two-part model can be tested using the non-nested hypothesis
testing framework proposed by Silva et al. (2014). The test, designed on the basis of the P and
C tests of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), allows the comparison between the two-part model
and, among others, the exponential conditional expectation model. The test they propose checks
117
whether the errors of the two-part model under the null hypothesis have zero expectations when the
weight given to each observation depends on the difference between the conditional expectations
of the two models.
3.9 Conclusion
The Aetna Wellness program was introduced in 2008 in order to improve the health maintenance,
risk identification and prevention for employees and families by a large self-insured employer.
While the features of the program are designed to help the employee, the increased emphasis on
preventive care is intended to be reflected in the lower hospitalization and emergency room use.
This study looks at the medical utilization of employees enrolled in the Aetna Wellness program,
comparing their use to non-participants in the program.
To avoid the problem of selection into a health plan, I use propensity score matching to match
the observations in the treated sample with observations in the control groups. Manual balancing
allows for a better comparison on the basis of observed covariates. I first present the baseline naive
specification results, and compare them to the non-balanced Stata propensity score match estimates
as well as the manually-balanced propensity score match estimates. The similarity of the results
suggest that there is room to improve in the matching mechanism, which is an extension of the
present study.
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The results suggest that there is no significant change in the overall medical expenditure. How-
ever, there is substantial compositional change in both expenditure and utilization by Aetna Well-
ness members. While switchers tend to be more intensive users of medical services, particularly in
pharmacy and outpatient, they tend to use fewer inpatient acute and emergency room services. Af-
ter joining, Aetna Wellness members experience a decline in pharmacy and inpatient expenditures
and services, but this decline is more than offset by a rise in preventive care services.
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Table 3.1: Plan Comparison for a Family, All Plans 2012
Aetna Wellness Aetna Third HSA Aetna 80/20
Premium 3515 4555 3828 3615 6133
Deductible
In Network 0 500 300 2400 1100
Out of Network 800 900 900 4800 1100
Out of Pocket Maximum
In Network 4000 4100 4100 5000 7100
Out of Network 7000 7100 7100 7000 7100
Coinsurance
In Network 90 90 90 90 80
Out of Network 80 80 70 80 80
Network Aetna Aetna PHCS Aetna Aetna
Must choose PCP Yes No No No No
Enhanced Wellness Program Yes No No No No
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Switchers v. Non-Switchers
Non Switchers Switchers
Mean / Std. Dev. Mean / Std. Dev.
Age 46.14 46.36
(11.48) (10.16)
Female .45 .58***
(.49) (.49)
Dependents 1.15 1.38***
(1.34) (1.41)
Employee Wage 66590 65188**
(47263) (44533)
Medical Utilization Intensity 2.07 2.20***
(1.21) (1.14)
Medical Expenses per person 4472 4935**
(11663) (12404)
Emergency Expenses per person 210 209
(736) (717)
Inpatient Acute Expenses per person 812 664*
(6747) (5090)
Pharmacy Expenses per person 975 1261***
(2615) (7661)
N 20597 14457
n 3914 2213
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Signif-
icant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: Switchers Before v. Switchers After
Before After
Mean / Std. Dev. Mean / Std. Dev.
Medical Utilization Intensity 2.28 2.04***
(1.13) (1.13)
Medical Expenses per person 4581 5689***
(11380) (14311)
Emergency Expenses per person 216 192
(715) (721)
Inpatient Acute Expenses per person 605 790*
(4088) (6741)
Pharmacy Expenses per person 1263 1255
(8081) (6682)
N 9830 4627
n 2213 2213
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Signif-
icant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.4: Baseline specification.
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff./se Coeff./se Coeff./se
Dep. Var.: Total Allowed Medical Expenditure
Aetna Wellness 466 4.12
(398) (379)
Age 145*** 167*** 167***
(15) (14) (14)
Female 244 323 330
(399) (373) (370)
No. of Dependents 2044*** 280 279
(142) (161) (162)
Salary 730** 719** 729**
(227) (220) (227)
Medical Utilization Intensity 1425*** 1426***
(136) (72)
Charlson Index 4600***
(420)
Wellness Member * Year
Switch year - 6 394
(597)
Switch year - 5 –204
(543)
Switch year - 4 –401
(564)
Switch year - 3 60
(475)
Switch year - 2 117
(656)
Switch year - 1 –376
(456)
Switch year 981
(580)
Switch year + 1 –1679***
(447)
Switch year +2 281
(788)
Switch year +3 985
(1350)
Switch year +4 –1038
(996)
Switch year + 5 –271
(1572)
Const –11211*** –13981*** –14123***
(2555) (2470) (2580)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 9820 9358 9358
N 31342 34476 34469
r2 .06 .06 .06
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.5: Baseline estimates for comparison of treatment and control by expenditure type.
Dep. Var.: Medical Expenditure Total ED RX IP Acute Other
Wellness Member 466.17 –2.30 426.84 –393.51* 435.13*
(398.87) (24.42) (227.25) (180.21) (184.68)
Dep. Var. Mean 9820.83 487.02 2181.32 1610.97 5541.51
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31342 31342 31342 31342 31342
r2 .07 .04 .03 .01 .08
Wellness Member 4.13 –20.43 328.56 –505.55** 201.55
(379.79) (22.79) (215.25) (161.51) (181.00)
Dep. Var. Mean 9358.73 469.21 2075.33 1537.91 5276.29
Charlson Index No No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34476 34476 34476 34476 34476
r2 .06 .05 .03 .01 .07
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5
percent level.
The dependent variables are: Total - total allowed amount by insurance; ED - total allowed
expenditure where emergency department is place of service; RX - total allowed pharmacy
expenditure; IP Acute - total allowed inpatient acute medical expenditure; Other - all other
medical expenditure.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.6: Baseline estimates for comparison of treatment and control in utilization
by type (intensive margin).
Dep. Var.: Number of Visits Emergency Preventive Inpatient Outpatient
Wellness Member –.02 .25*** –.05 2.93***
(.02) (.03) (.04) (.29)
Dep. Var. Mean .51 1.63 .38 16.87
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 30319 30319 30319 30319
r2 .08 .21 .01 .22
Wellness Member –.04* .21*** –.09* 2.19***
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.26)
Dep. Var. Mean .50 1.60 .38 16.51
Charlson Index No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 32633 32633 32633 32633
r2 .10 .24 .01 .29
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant
at 5 percent level.
The dependent variables are: Emergency - number of visits where emergency de-
partment is the place of service; Preventive - number of preventive visits; Inpatient -
number of inpatient visits; Outpatient - number of outpatient visits.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.7: Baseline estimates for comparison of treatment and control in utilization by type
(extensive margin).
Dep. Var.: Ever Visit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ED Prev. Smoke Alc. Nutr. Mamm.
Wellness Member –.02*** .04*** –.03*** –.02*** –.02* .07***
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mean Dep. Var. .32 .67 .03 .04 .17 .43
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31342 31342 31342 31342 31342 15830
r2 .06 .14 .05 .04 .06 .14
Wellness Member –.04*** .03*** –.04*** –.03*** –.03*** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mean Dep. Var. .33 .67 .05 .06 .19 .43
Charlson Index No No No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34476 34476 34476 34476 34476 17384
r2 .05 .14 .07 .06 .02 .13
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
In each column, the dependent variable is a count of visits by category. The categories are
as follows: (1) Emergency visits; (2) Preventive visits; (3) Smoking counseling; (4) Alcohol
counseling; (5) Nutritional counseling; (6) Mammography visits.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.8: Two part estimation of Aetna Wellness effect conditional on any expenditure
Total ED Acute RX
Dep. Var.: Med. Expenditure P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0 P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0 P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0 P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0
Wellness Member .03*** 291.94 .01 –34.01 .00 –4388.05* .04*** 398.01
(.00) (407.88) (.01) (64.13) (.00) (1701.99) (.00) (246.08)
Mean Dep. Var. .97 10164.67 .32 1510.35 .10 16882.85 .90 2434.40
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31342 30283 31342 10110 31342 2995 31342 28084
r2 .06 .03 .02 .03
Wellness Member .04*** –316.30 .00 –75.57 –.00 –4927.47** .05*** 270.20
(.00) (395.09) (.01) (61.47) (.00) (1573.52) (.01) (238.25)
Mean Dep. Var. .95 9900.10 .31 1498.31 .09 16649.76 .87 2382.06
Charlson Index No No No No No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34476 32592 34476 10800 34476 3189 34476 30037
r2 .06 .04 .02 .02
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Each pair of columns represent a type of medical expenditure. For each type of medical expenditure, the first stage is a logit where the
dependent is a binary variable for any expenditure. The second stage is a OLS with dependent variable of expenditure, conditional on
non-zero level of expenditure. The types of medical expenditure are Total - total medical expenditure; ED - expenditure in emergency room;
Acute - inpatient hospital acute expenditure; RX - pharmacy expenditure.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.9: Coefficient estimate on propensity matching of
treatment and control by expenditure type.
Baseline Matched: ATE
Dependent Variable
Total Medical Expense 466.17 268.66
(398.87) (150.70)
Emergency Expense –2.30 –6.76
(24.42) (10.12)
Pharmacy Expense 426.84 276.38***
(227.25) (76.34)
Inpatient Acute –393.51* –484.91*
(180.21) (199.18)
Other 435.13* 392.44**
(184.68) (138.05)
Emergency (number of visits) –.02 –.02
(.02) (.01)
Preventive (number of visits) .25*** .25***
(.03) (.02)
Inpatient (number of visits) –.05 –.08*
(.04) (.03)
Outpatient (number of visits) 2.93*** 2.89***
(.29) (.19)
Emergency (ever) –.02*** –.02**
(.01) (.01)
Preventive (ever) .04*** .04***
(.01) (.01)
Smoking cessation –.03*** –.03***
(.00) (.00)
Alcohol counseling –.02*** –.02***
(.00) (.00)
Nutrition –.02*** –.02**
(.01) (.01)
Mammograms .07*** .03***
(.01) (.01)
Charlson Index Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.10: Coefficient estimate on propensity matching of
treatment and control by expenditure type.
Baseline Matched: ATE
Dependent Variable
Total Medical Expense 4.13 316.61
(379.79) (171.27)
Emergency Expense –20.43 –6.21
(22.79) (9.05)
Pharmacy Expense 328.56 298.62**
(2215.25) (101.33)
Inpatient Acute –505.55** –386.84**
(161.51) (145.69)
Other 201.55 182.04
(181.00) (141.88)
Emergency (number of visits) –.04* –.03*
(.02) (.01)
Preventive (number of visits) .21*** .21***
(.03) (.02)
Inpatient (number of visits) –.09* –.07**
(.03) (.03)
Outpatient (number of visits) 2.19*** 2.32***
(.26) (.17)
Emergency (ever) –.04*** –.03***
(.01) (.01)
Preventive (ever) .03*** .03***
(.01) (.01)
Smoking cessation –.04*** –.03***
(.00) (.00)
Alcohol counseling –.03*** –.03***
(.00) (.00)
Nutrition –.03*** –.03***
(.01) (.01)
Mammograms .05*** .01
(.01) (.01)
Charlson Index No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent
level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.11: Covariate characteristics after manual balancing by treatment status.
Variable Control Treated Norm. Diff. pi0.05
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Control Treated
Age 46.69 11.39 46.64 10.12 -.0052 .0705 .0242
Female .4460 .4970 .5837 .4929 .2783 0 0
Dependents 1.22 1.35 1.41 1.41 .1377 .0159 .0195
Ln(Salary) 10.88 .8025 10.89 .6633 .0143 .0595 .0445
Medical Utilization 4.49 2.93 4.85 3.07 .1215 .0188 .0369
Family Health .3582 .9126 .3240 .7950 -.0399 .0251 .0068
Normalized difference defined as ND = MeanT−MeanC√
(Vart+Varc)/2
pi0.05Control is the percentage of treated sample in the 5% outlier range of the control group. pi
0.05
Treated is
the percentage of control sample in the 5% outlier range of the treated group.
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Table 3.12: Coefficient on switching dummy by expenditure type comparing baseline to matched and manually
balanced matched.
Baseline Matched: ATE
Stata Balanced Manually Balanced
Coeff./ Robust Std. Err. Coeff./ Robust Std. Err. Coeff./ Robust Std. Err.
Dependent Variable
Total Medical Expense 50.46 198.45 * 179.08
(373.92) (154.74) (159.94)
Emergency Expense –17.42 –18.41 –14.57
(23.77) (10.13) (8.66)
Pharmacy Expense 284.24 291.89*** 265.07**
(205.41) (82.67) (86.12)
Inpatient Acute –436.41** –331.20* –429.38**
(161.91) (159.32) (164.55)
Other 361.25 456.96** 191.84
(195.80) (163.50) (134.79)
Emergency (number of visits) –.02 –.03* –.03*
(.02) (.01) (.01)
Preventive (number of visits) .49*** .45*** .21***
(.03) (.02) (.02)
Inpatient (number of visits) –.06 –.07* –.06*
(.04) (.03) (.02)
Outpatient (number of visits) 2.44*** 2.14*** 2.24***
(.29) (.18) (.15)
Emergency (ever) –.03*** –.03*** –.03***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Preventive (ever) .05*** .06*** .04***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Smoking cessation –.03*** –.03*** –.02***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Alcohol counseling –.03*** –.03*** –.02***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Nutrition –.03*** –.03*** –.02***
(.01) (.01) (.00)
Mammograms .04*** .02** .02***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Stata Balanced: uses Stata teffects command with nearest neighbor matching and robust standard errors, does
not adjust for covariate balancing by strata. Manually Balanced: uses Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming) sug-
gested method for covariate balancing by strata, followed by Stata teffects command with nearest neighbor
matching.
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Table 3.13: Baseline estimates for comparison of treatment and control after switching to
Aetna Wellness.
Dep. Var.: Expenditure Total ED RX IP Acute Other
After Switching 760.81 –94.48*** 52.11 –157.70 960.88***
(427.68) (24.98) (110.50) (255.07) (256.48)
Mean Dep. Var. 9820.83 487.02 2181.32 1610.97 5541.51
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31342 31342 31342 31342 31342
r2 .07 .04 .03 .01 .08
After Switching 464.00 –107.90*** 14.12 –252.63 810.40**
(427.03) (24.41) (112.14) (245.97) (259.28)
Mean Dep. Var. 9358.73 469.21 2075.33 1537.91 5276.29
Charlson Index No No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34476 34476 34476 34476 34476
r2 .06 .05 .03 .01 .07
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
The dependent variables are: Total - total allowed amount by insurance; ED - total allowed
expenditure where emergency department is place of service; RX - total allowed pharmacy
expenditure; IP Acute - total allowed inpatient acute medical expenditure; Other - all other
medical expenditure.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.14: Baseline estimates for comparison of treatment and control in utilization
after switching to Aetna Wellness (intensive margin).
Dep. Var.: Number of Visits Emergency Preventive Inpatient Outpatient
After Switching –.13*** .21*** –.05 4.61***
(.02) (.04) (.04) (.38)
Mean Dep. Var. .51 1.63 .38 16.87
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 30319 30319 30319 30319
r2 .08 .21 .01 .22
After Switching –.16*** .18*** –.09* 4.05***
(.02) (.04) (.04) (.36)
Mean Dep. Var. .50 1.60 .38 16.51
Charlson Index No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 32633 32633 32633 32633
r2 .10 .24 .01 .29
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant
at 5 percent level.
The dependent variables are: Emergency - number of visits where emergency de-
partment is the place of service; Preventive - number of preventive visits; Inpatient -
number of inpatient visits; Outpatient - number of outpatient visits.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.15: Baseline estimates for comparison of treatment and control in utilization after
switching to Aetna Wellness (extensive margin).
Dep. Var.: Ever Visit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ED Prev. Smoke Alc. Nutr. Mamm.
After Switching –.08*** .03** –.04*** –.03*** –.02* .05***
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mean Dep. Var. .32 .67 .03 .04 .17 .43
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31342 31342 31342 31342 31342 15830
r2 .07 .14 .05 .04 .06 .13
After Switching –.11*** .01 –.06*** –.06*** –.05*** .03*
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mean Dep. Var. .33 .67 .05 .06 .19 .43
Charlson Index No No No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34476 34476 34476 34476 34476 17384
r2 .06 .14 .07 .06 .02 .13
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
In each column, the dependent variable is a count of visits by category. The categories are
as follows: (1) Emergency visits; (2) Preventive visits; (3) Smoking counseling; (4) Alcohol
counseling; (5) Nutritional counseling; (6) Mammography visits.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.16: Two part estimation of Aetna Wellness effect after switching conditional on any expenditure
Total ED Acute RX
Dep. Var.: Med. Expenditure P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0 P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0 P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0 P(Exp>0) Exp|Exp>0
After Switching .14*** 468.90 –.06*** –8.13 .00 –2057.06 .04*** –8.30
(.02) (432.72) (.01) (77.44) (.01) (2739.47) (.01) (119.04)
Mean Dep. Var. .97 10164.67 .32 1510.35 .10 16882.85 .90 2434.40
Charlson Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Medical Utilization Intensity No No No No No No No No
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31342 30283 31342 10110 31342 2995 31342 28084
r2 .06 .03 .02 .03
After Switching .21*** –133.39 –.07*** –56.97 –.01 –214.53 .06*** –223.73
(.03) (413.83) (.01) (80.34) (.01) (2606.67) (.01) (118.74)
Mean Dep. Var. .95 9674.83 .31 1491.20 .09 16570.42 .87 2352.96
Charlson Index No No No No No No No No
Medical Utilization Intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 32756 31049 32756 10150 32756 2960 32756 28653
r2 .04 .03 .01 .02
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5 percent level.
Each pair of columns represent a type of medical expenditure. For each type of medical expenditure, the first stage is a logit where the
dependent is a binary variable for any expenditure. The second stage is a OLS with dependent variable of expenditure, conditional on
non-zero level of expenditure. The types of medical expenditure are Total - total medical expenditure; ED - expenditure in emergency room;
Acute - inpatient hospital acute expenditure; RX - pharmacy expenditure.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Table 3.17: Covariate characteristics after manual balancing by treatment status.
Variable Control Treated Norm. Diff. pi0.05
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Control Treated
Age 46.75 10.97 48.23 10.12 .1403 .0657 .0311
Female .5049 .4999 .6148 .4866 .2228 0 0
Dependents 1.26 1.37 1.39 1.41 .0922 .0165 .0206
Ln(Salary) 10.89 .7262 10.86 .8595 -.0417 .0286 .1544
Faculty -2.08 14.99 -3.64 19.23 -.0901 0 .0390
Medical Utilization 2.56 .8851 2.69 .8263 .1480 .0166 .0136
Family Health .2077 .6594 .2074 .6069 -.0004 .0091 .0086
Normalized difference defined as ND = MeanT−MeanC√
(Vart+Varc)/2
pi0.05Control is the percentage of treated sample in the 5% outlier range of the control group. pi
0.05
Treated is
the percentage of control sample in the 5% outlier range of the treated group.
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Table 3.18: Coefficient estimate on propensity matching of treatment and control by
expenditure type after switching to Aetna Wellness.
Baseline Matched: ATE
Stata Balanced Manually Balanced
Dependent Variable
Total Medical Expense 133.65 242.15 56.10
(562.99) (189.67) (185.35)
Emergency Expense –166.67*** –69.04*** –70.57***
(34.25) (11.08) (10.86)
Pharmacy Expense –531.99* –72.18 –72.44
(271.22) (55.59) (73.84)
Inpatient Acute 123.53 –328.96 –394.52*
(294.72) (213.93) (194.09)
Other 776.52** 435.83* 556.02**
(252.97) (187.71) (197.24)
Emergency (number of visits) –.19*** –.19*** –.17***
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Preventive (number of visits) .99*** 1.02*** .08*
(.05) (.05) (.04)
Inpatient (number of visits) –.05 –.11* –.12***
(.04) (.05) (.04)
Outpatient (number of visits) 4.05*** 4.23*** 4.25***
(.46) (.34) (.33)
Emergency (ever) –.10*** –.10*** –.09***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Preventive (ever) .08*** .11*** .02
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Smoking cessation –.02*** –.03*** –.03***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Alcohol counseling –.01* –.02*** –.02***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Nutrition –.01 –.02 –.01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Mammograms .01 .02* .03***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Demographic Var. Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
*** Significant at 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at 1 percent level. * Significant at 5
percent level.
Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Stata Balanced: uses Stata teffects command with nearest neighbor matching and ro-
bust standard errors, does not adjust for covariate balancing by strata. Manually Bal-
anced: uses Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming) suggested method for covariate balancing
by strata, followed by Stata teffects command with nearest neighbor matching.
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Figure 3.1: Treatment v. Control: Time of joining Aetna Wellness.
2007
Total Sample: N
2008
New Joiners: N_08
No Joiners:  N-N_08
2009
New Joiners: N_09
Joined:  N_08
No Joiners:  N-N_08-N_09
2010
New Joiners: N_10
Joined:  N_08+N_09
No Joiners:  N-N_08-N_09-N_10
2011
New Joiners: N_11
Joined:  N_08+N_09+N_10
No Joiners:  N-N_08-N_09-N_10-N_11
2012
New Joiners: N_12
Joined:  N_08+N_09+N_10+N_11
No Joiners:  N-N_08-N_09-N_10-N_11-N_12
2013
New Joiners: N_13
Joined:  N_08+N_09+N_10+N_11+N_13
Never Joiners  N-N_08-N_09-N_10-N_11-N_12+N_13
137
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
Time to Switch
(a) Total Expenditure
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
Time to Switch
(b) Emergency Expenditure
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
Time to Swtich
(c) Pharmacy Expenditure
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
Time to Switch
(d) Inpatient Acute Expenditure
Figure 3.2: Event Study by Expenditure Type
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Figure 3.3: Propensity score by treatment category.
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Figure 3.4: Covariate by treatment status after manual balancing.
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Figure 3.5: Covariate by treatment status after manual balancing (after switching).
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